

DIARY 2012



MA'AN Development Center

DIARY

2012

Personal Data

Name

Address

Office Tel. No.

Home Tel. No.

Mobile No.

Blood Group

Passport No.

Bank Account No.

Annual Renewals

Date Due

Driving Licence

Passport

Car Registration Licence

2012 Year Planning Calender

	Sat.	Sun.	Mon.	Tue.	Wed.	Thu.	Fri.
JANUARY							
		1	2	3	4	5	6
	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
	28	29	30	31			
FEBRUARY					1	2	3
	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
	25	26	27	28	29		
MARCH						1	2
	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
	31						
APRIL							
		1	2	3	4	5	6
	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
	28	29	30				
MAY				1	2	3	4
	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
	26	27	28	29	30	31	
JUNE							1
	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
	23	24	25	26	27	28	29
	30						

2012 Year Planning Calender

	Sat.	Sun.	Mon.	Tue.	Wed.	Thu.	Fri.
JULY							
		1	2	3	4	5	6
	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
	28	29	30	31			
AUGUST					1	2	3
	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
SEPTEMBER							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
	29	30					
OCTOBER			1	2	3	4	5
	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
	20	21	22	23	24	25	26
	27	28	29	30	31		
NOVEMBER						1	2
	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
DECEMBER							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
	29	30	31				

Palestine in Figures

Area:

Land Area: 26.323 km²

Occupied Palestinian Territory (oPt): 6,020 km²

West Bank: 5.655 km² (130 km long, 40-65 km wide)

Gaza Strip: 365 km² (45 km long and 5-12 km wide)

Water Area: 438 km

Green Line: approx. 320 km

Area Confiscated by the Occupation:

West Bank: almost 733 km² (13%) of the area in the West Bank

Gaza Strip: 87 km² (24%) of the area in the Gaza Strip

Population and Demography:

oPt: 4,108,631

West Bank: 2,546,725

Gaza Strip: 1,561,906

Jerusalem Governorate: approx. 386,000

Population by Gender (Male/Female):

oPt: 2,085,996/2,022,635

West Bank: 1,293,146/1,253,579

Gaza Strip: 793,850/769,056

Fertility Rate: 4.2 births per woman (West Bank: 3.8, Gaza Strip: 4.9)

Crude Birth Rate: 32.8

Crude Death Rate: 4.0

Average Household Size:

oPt: 5.8

West Bank: 5.6

Gaza Strip: 6.3

Population Density: (capita/km²)

oPt: 682

West Bank: 450

Gaza Strip: 4,279

Land Use and Agriculture

Area of oPt: 6,020 km²

Area of oPt by Type of Use:

Cultivated Land: 960.3 km² (16.0% total area of oPt)

Forested Land: 91.7km² (1.5% total area of oPt) (2009)

Cultivated Land Lost to Separation Wall: 348 km² (15%)

Education

Literacy Rate for Persons 15 Years and Over: 94.9% (2010)

No. of Schools: 2,647 (2010-11)

No. of Students: approx. 1,128,000 (approx. 563,000 boys and 565,000 girls) (2010-11)

No. of Teachers: 43,559 (2007-08)

No. of Classes: 35,263 (2009-10)

Students per Class: 31.6 (2009-10)

Government schools: 31.2

UNRWA schools: 37.0

Private schools: 23.5

No. of University Students: 182,453 (2009-10)

No. of University Graduates: 27,129 (2008-09)

Health (2009)

No. of Hospitals: 75

Hospital Beds: 5058

Physicians per 1000 people: *West Bank:* 1.3; *Gaza Strip:* 3.2

Nurses per 1000 people: *West Bank:* 1.6; *Gaza Strip:* 5.5

Dentists per 1000 people: oPt: 0.6

Labor (2010)

Unemployment Rate:

oPt: 23.7% (*Male:* 23.1%; *Female:* 26.8%)

West Bank: 17.2% (*Male:* 16.6%; *Female:* 19.7%)

Gaza Strip: 37.8% (*Male:* 36.2%; *Female:* 47.8%)

Labor Force Participation Rate:

oPt: 41.1% (*Male:* 66.8%; *Female:* 14.7%)

West Bank: 43.7%

Gaza Strip: 36.4%

Nominal Daily Median Wage for Employees:

West Bank: 76.9 NIS (US\$20.35)

Gaza: 46.2 NIS (US\$12.25)

Percentage of Employed Children (Paid or Unpaid):

oPt: 3.7%

West Bank: 5.7%

Gaza Strip: 0.6%

Percentage of Employed Children Classified as Unpaid Family Members: 63%

(Male: 57.9%; Female: 94.2%)

Percentage of Employed Children Classified as Paid, Working for Others: 27.6%

(Male: 36.1%; Female: 3%)

Economics (2010)

GDP: US\$5,728 million (2010)

GDP per capita:

oPt: US\$1,415.70

West Bank: US\$1,837.80

Gaza Strip: US\$786.80

Total Exports: US\$518 million

Total Imports:

oPt: US\$3,600 million

West Bank: US\$3,327 million

Gaza Strip: US\$273 million

Environment

Available Quantities of Water: 316.0 million m³

Annual Quantity of Water Purchased from Israeli Water Company (Mekorot) for Domestic Use: 53.5 million m³

Percentage of Households Connected to the Public Water Network: 91.8%

Percentage of Households Connected to Waste Water Network:

oPt: 52.1%

West Bank: 35.5%

Gaza Strip: 83.8%

Percentage of Households That Use Cesspits for Waste Water:

oPt: 47.2%

West Bank: 63.5%

Gaza Strip: 16.0%

Source:

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics

www.ppcbs.gov.ps

Distances from Jerusalem		
Place	Distance	Direction
Akka	181 km	NW
Bethlehem	10 km	S
Gaza City	104 km	SW
Haifa	157 km	NW
Khalil (Hebron)	36 km	S
Jenin	106 km	N
Jericho	35 km	E
Nablus	63 km	N
Nazareth	135 km	N
Rafah	142 km	SW
Ramallah	16 km	N
Safad	234 km	N
Tiberias	198 km	N
Tulkarem	85 km	NW

Conversions

Length		
1 centimeter (cm)	= 10 millimeters (mm)	= .03937 inches (in)
1 decimeter (dm)	= 10 cm	= 3.937 in
1 meter (m)	= 10 dm = 100 cm	= 1.0936 yards (yd)
1 kilometer (km)	= 1000m	= .6214 miles (M)
1 inch (in)		= 2.54 cm
1 foot (ft)	= 12 in	= 30.48 cm
1 yd	= 3 ft = 36 in	= 0.9144 m
1 mile	= 1760 yd	= 1.6093 km

Area		
1 sq cm	= 100 sq mm	= 0.155 sq in
1 sq meter	= 10,000 sq cm	= 1.196 sq yd
1 hectare (ha)	= 1000 sq m	= 0.2471 acres
1 sq km	= 100 hectares (ha)	= .03861 sq M
1 sq in		= 6.4516 sq cm
1 sq yd	= 9 square ft	= 0.8361 sq m
1 sq M	= 640 acres	= 2.59 sq km
1 acre	= 4.0468 dunams	

Capacity and volume		
1 cu cm (cc)		= 0.0610 cu in
1 cu m	= 1000 cu dm	= 1.3080 cu yd
1 liter (l)	= 1 cu dm = 1000cc	= .2200 gallons (gal)
1 hectoliter (hl)	= 100 l	= 21.997 gal
1 cu in		= 16.387 cc
1 cu ft	=6.23 gal	= 49.86 pints (pt)
1 cu yd	=27 cu ft	= 0.7646 cu m
1 pt		= 20 ounces (oz)
1 gal	= 8 pt	= .16 cu ft

Weight		
1 gram (g)	= 1000 milligrams (mg)	= 0.0353 (oz)
1 kilogram (kg)	= 1000 g	= 2.2046 pounds (lb)
1 ton (t)	= 1000 kg	= 2,204.6226 lb
1 oz	= 437.5 grains	= 28.35 g
1 lb	= 16 oz	= 0.4536 kg

Temperature		
Temperature conversion	Degree C	Degree F
	0	32
	5	41
Degree F = (1.8*degree C) + 32	20	68
Degree C = (degree F - 32) / 1.8	50	122
	100	212

What is MA'AN?

MA'AN Development Center is an independent Palestinian development and training institution established in January 1989, registered by law as a non-profit organization. The main office is located in Ramallah and the four branch offices are located in Gaza, Khan Younis, Tulkarem and Jenin. MA'AN's work is informed by the necessity of creating independent, self-reliant initiatives that lead to the development of human resources for sustainable development, which incorporate values of self-sufficiency and self-empowerment.

MA'AN's Mission

To partner and work hand in hand with Palestinian NGOs, Community Based organizations, committees and grassroots groups in the poorest and most marginalized areas to improve the quality of their lives and empower them to take a lead in developing their communities and achieving self reliance, steadfastness and sustainable development based on freedom, participation equity & equality, respect for human rights, democracy, and social justice through achieving the following five goals: Improving the food security situation of the poorest and most marginalized sectors of the Palestinian society at the family & community level

Mission Statement:

To improve the quality of life for Palestinians and empower them to take a lead in developing their communities and achieving self reliance and sustainable development.

1. Improving the food security situation of the poorest and most marginalized sectors of the Palestinian society at the family & community level
2. To develop and enhance the capacities of the Palestinian NGOs, CBOs and grassroots organizations to be able to fulfill their missions and goals so as to contribute to building a Palestinian civil and democratic society based on political pluralism and respect of human rights
3. To enhance community development and decrease poverty in rural and the most disadvantaged areas
4. To protect and develop the Palestinian environment

5. To raise awareness and advocate for and with the Palestinian community on their national rights at the local, national, and international level

These goals are realized though the following programs:

1. Agricultural and Food Security Program
2. Community Development Program
3. Women Development Program
4. Youth and Adolescent Development Program
5. Environment Protection Program



Capacity Building, Advocacy and Lobbying are cross cutting issues that are tools used throughout MA'AN's programs

Ma'an seeks to reach certain key target groups through their programs and activities. The target groups can be characterized as:

Target Group/Beneficiaries	Programs for this Group
Rural Women	Women Development Program
Youth and Adolescents	Youth and adolescent Development Program
Farmers	Agricultural and Food Security Program
CBOs and their members	Community Development Program
Jordan Valley Citizens	Environment Protection Program Community Development Program

Food Security as a Measure of Food Sovereignty

The 1996 World Food Summit defined **Food Security** as a general state “when all people at all times have both physical and economic access to sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a productive and healthy life.” The concept of food security comprises four separate and distinct components:

1. **Food availability** – whether produced locally or imported
2. **Food accessibility** – where all individuals have access to adequate resources to meet appropriate dietary needs
3. **Food stability** – where access to adequate food is permanently secured, with no risk of shocks
4. **Food utilization** – the consumption of food with adequate sanitation, clean water and where health care is provided

Thus, the various classifications of food security is far more complex than simply whether a household has access to enough food. It is rather a measurement of how the situation that surrounds the household is affecting its ability to consistently eat healthily and normally. Food instability can result from global food market fluctuations, unusual weather patterns, or simply something as basic as a poor local harvest. In Palestine, of course, the causes of food insecurity are completely political.

Food insecurity in the Palestinian territories is exceptionally high, particularly in Gaza and in Area C of the West Bank. But what exactly does it mean to be food insecure? The WFP and the FAO have used local Palestinian conditions, including the consumer price index, the poverty rate and the household size, to quantify what can otherwise be seen as a relatively vague concept.

1. **Food secure:** Households with *both* income and consumption above US\$5.60 per adult equivalent per day.¹

1- The concept of “adult equivalent” means that all income earners are considered, rather than simply the adults.

2. **Marginally secure:** Households with *either* income or consumption (not both) above US\$5.60 per adult equivalent per day.
3. **Vulnerable to food insecurity:** Households with both income and consumption *below* US\$5.60 per adult equivalent per day.
4. **Food insecure:** Households with income and consumption *below* US\$4.70 per adult equivalent per day.²

Food security, therefore, is clearly linked to prevalence of poverty. **Poverty in the Palestinian territories** can be divided into two categories:

1. **Poverty:** The poverty line for a household of two adults and three children was set in 2010 at 2,237 Israeli shekels (US\$609, where US\$1 equals 3.73 NIS).
2. **Deep Poverty:** The deep poverty line for a household of two adults and three children stood at 1,783 Israeli shekels (US\$478)

In Palestine, 25% of the population lives in poverty. In the Gaza Strip, poverty levels reach 38% while the West Bank has a poverty level of 18.3%. In the Gaza Strip 23% of Palestinians live below the deep poverty line compared to 8.8% in the West Bank and 14.1% in all of the Palestinian territories.³ Poverty, of course, is a major factor in the ability of households to purchase food; the poorer the household, the more vulnerable it is to food insecurity. Though poverty is related to and even increases high levels of food insecurity, however, it is not the main cause. The inability to maximize local resources and to become food self-sufficient -- to be food sovereign -- is the fundamental base of food insecurity. To reduce food insecurity, the obstacles to food sovereignty must be targeted.


2- Note: Food security or poverty are measured based on household consumption or income. Usually, household consumption is higher than household income due to the foreign assistance provided to needy families and the coping mechanisms adopted (such as self-production of food).

3- Wafa News Agency, Quarter of Palestinians Live Below Poverty Line-PCBS, 4 April 2011


Table1: Levels (%) of food security, vulnerability, marginal security and insecurity in the oPt 2009 and 2010.¹

Total OPT				
	Food Insecure	Vulnerable	Marginally Secure	Food Secure
2009	36	11	21	32
2010	33	13	21	33
Gaza Strip				
	Food Insecure	Vulnerable	Marginally Secure	Food Secure
2009	60	9	7	24
2010	52	13	16	19
West Bank				
	Food Insecure	Vulnerable	Marginally Secure	Food Secure
2009	22	13	28	36
2010	22	12	24	41

Graph 1: Levels (%) of food security, vulnerability, marginal security and insecurity in the oPt 2009 and 2010.²



Graph 2: Food Insecurity (%) in Area C.



- 1 Socio economic and food security survey: West Bank and Gaza Strip , Occupied Palestinian Territory 2010. World Food Program, Food and Agriculture Organization and the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics.
- 2 Socio economic and food security survey: West Bank and Gaza Strip , Occupied Palestinian Territory 2010. World Food Program, Food and Agriculture Organization and the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics <http://home.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp232398.pdf>



Introduction

A young child with dark skin and curly hair is walking barefoot on a dusty, uneven ground. The child is wearing a light-colored long-sleeved shirt with a graphic and dark pants. In the background, there is a makeshift structure with plastic sheeting and various debris scattered around, suggesting a informal settlement or a place of displacement.

Introduction:

“Food *security, at the individual, household, national, regional and global levels [is achieved] when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.”*

“Food sovereignty is the right of each nation to maintain and develop its own capacity to produce its basic foods respecting cultural and productive diversity. We have the right to produce our own food in our own territory.”¹

1- Palestine Economic Policy Research Center (2010.) Food Security Bulletin, Issue 4 Summer 2010.

The issues of food security and food sovereignty in Palestine are closely linked but often misconstrued and conflated. The differences between the two are subtle yet important. In short, food security exists along a continuum that measures to what extent people are able to provide themselves and their families with adequate amounts of healthy and nutritious food, whereas food sovereignty reflects the right of people and nations to dictate their own food policies and thus ensure food self-sufficiency. If a country is unable to direct its own food policy and consequently relies on imported foodstuff, it lacks food sovereignty. Comparatively, a family that is unable to regularly eat healthy and safe foods is food insecure. Though counterintuitive, there can be demographic groups that are food insecure in a country that has achieved food sovereignty as well as demographic groups that are food secure in countries that lack food sovereignty. This superficial contradiction does not eliminate the strong connection between the two concepts. A country that maintains food sovereignty has the ability to alter its food policy and move towards eliminating food insecurity; a country without food sovereignty may have certain levels of food security, but lacks the fundamental ability to alter policies in order to decrease food insecurity.

While the concept of food security has been well-defined by many international agencies, food sovereignty lacks a widely accepted definition. Though the idea of food sovereignty can be applied as broadly as one might like -- the European Union, for example, can achieve food sovereignty just as a single household can -- the idea behind food sovereignty remains constant. Regardless of the scope of the definition, food sovereignty has at its base the fundamental concept of democratic participation and the idea of individual and collective rights. Unlike food security, which does not address the way food is accessed, food sovereignty implies local control over food resources and democratic participation in decisions regarding food policy.

For the purposes of this agenda, we will be defining food sovereignty as a nation's right to democratically dictate its food policy in order to achieve self-sufficiency. This includes the basic right to independently produce and consume safe, nutritious, and culturally-appropriate food. In particular, Palestinian food sovereignty is the right of Palestinians to independently set their own food policies and to control their national food-producing resources that provide them with the ability to sustain themselves and ultimately enable food security.

The extent to which one is food secure can be statistically measured by considering data such as the fluctuations of the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the percentage of income spent on food, and the amount of food consumed per day, as well as by comparing the types of food that are actually consumed to the types of food that would normally be consumed in any given society. Food sovereignty, on the other hand, is less measurable. As one aspect of food sovereignty is the ability to be self-sufficient, one could analyze the amount of food locally produced in comparison to the amount of food that is consumed or exported, and make conclusions about the degree of self-sufficiency attained. Yet, such an analysis would be incomplete. Another major tenet of food sovereignty, as mentioned, is the right to dictate national food policy. Much like the right to vote or the right to free speech, the right to dictate national food policy is dichotomous: nations either have this right or they do not. Thus, if a country has not attained food sovereignty, the best analysis is not to quantify the extent to which a nation has fallen short, but rather to identify the factors that are inhibiting this right.

It is evident that in the case of Palestine, neither complete food security or food sovereignty exists. Annually, international aid organizations and human rights groups release detailed reports on the varying levels of food insecurity in Palestine. According to the World Food Program (WFP), the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the Palestinian Central Bureau

of Statistics (PCBS), 33% of Palestinians in 2010 and 36% of Palestinians in 2009 were food insecure. The FAO reported that 38% of Palestinians were food insecure in 2008; the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNWRA) reported that Palestinian food insecurity was at 38% in 2007 as well and 34% in 2006. In other words, it is widely known and reported that around one-third of the Palestinian people are consistently unable to provide healthy and nutritious food to their families. The relative consistency of the rate of Palestinian food insecurity is directly related to the complete lack of Palestinian food sovereignty.

According to the FAO and the WFP, food insecurity is measured using a complex equation that factors in household income, expenditure on food and socioeconomic vulnerability, a subcategory that factors in household size, the amount of aid received, refugee status, and future expectations of financial status. Furthermore, these factors are cross-referenced with the consumer price index (CPI) for food in the respective region. The result is the ability to categorize Palestinians into four clusters: food secure, marginally secure, vulnerable to food insecurity, and food insecure.

In 2010, according to the FAO and the WFP, 33% of Palestinians were considered food insecure, 13% were vulnerable to food insecurity, 21% were marginally secure and 33% were food secure (see Chart 1.) These rates differed little from 2009, when 36% of Palestinians were food insecure, 11% were vulnerable to food insecurity, 21% were marginally secure, and 33% were food secure (see Table 1). These levels of food insecurity throughout Palestine can be better understood by looking at the socioeconomic situations of various demographic groups. Logically, the higher the poverty rate, the less a demographic cluster will be able to purchase even if the other requirements for food security remain constant. Consequently, there is a distinct connection between unemployment, poverty, and the percentage of house-

hold income spent on food. All three sets of connected data have an immense effect on the levels of food insecurity. More importantly, though, these statistics all indicate the absence of food sovereignty.

The strict Israeli closure of the Gazan borders, and the amputation of the East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank have disrupted the ability of Palestinians to reach an important job market. Moreover, the restrictions on movement throughout the West Bank, the land and property confiscations, and the lack of economic and physical development in Area C have all contributed to high Palestinian unemployment and poverty rates.

In Gaza, the Israeli restrictions on imports and exports as well as daily military incursions have resulted in an increased difficulty for Palestinian businesses to expand. The unilaterally-imposed Buffer Zone along the border with Israel and the limitations on the Palestinian fishing industry have severely hindered the ability of the agricultural and fishery industries in Gaza to both maximize food production and to employ Palestinian laborers. Unemployment levels in Gaza have reached 40% in 2010, while 38% of Gazans live under the poverty line. Unsurprisingly, the average Gazan family spends nearly 41% of household income on food expenditures. (Comparatively, the percentage of household income spent on food in Israel is significantly lower at 17.7%.) The depressed socioeconomic status of Palestinians in Gaza resulted in food insecurity levels of 52% in 2010. Only 19% of the Gazan population is able to regularly consume adequate levels of healthy food.

In the West Bank, increased development efforts by the Palestinian Authority under Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, particularly in urban areas, has allowed for a better economic situation than in Gaza. Yet, despite the relative economic advantage of the West Bank, unemployment and poverty are still tremendously high. Unemployment in the West Bank (including East

Jerusalem) reached 17.2% in 2010, while poverty rates soared over 18%. Like in Gaza, high levels of poverty and unemployment have forced families to spend a higher percentage of their household income on food, reaching nearly 34%. The corresponding levels of food insecurity are unsurprising, leveling out at 33% of the population.

This level of food insecurity is somewhat deceiving, however, when considering the entirety of the West Bank. The Palestinian Authority's development policies have been unable to target rural, Area C communities. As a result, food security is considerably higher in Area A than in Area C. In the closed area between the separation wall and the Green Line, called the seam zone, 40% of the population is either food insecure or dangerously vulnerable to food insecurity. Likewise, a WFP/UNRWA study revealed that 55-79% of the 150,000 herders and Bedouin in Area C are food insecure, even after accounting for food aid. Without food aid, 79% of households in Area C were food insecure, leading to 46% of Palestinian children in Area C having medical conditions caused by malnutrition.

While the poverty, unemployment and food insecurity rates throughout Palestine are alarming, they are simply the visible and quantifiable manifestations of a greater ill. A 2008 report by the WFP, the FAO, and UNRWA unequivocally cites the lack of Palestinian food sovereignty as this greater cause: "The main driver of Palestinian food insecurity is of a political nature, as key elements of vulnerability are rooted in the military and administrative measures imposed by the Israeli occupation – closure regime, permits, destruction of assets - as well as settlement expansion and derived infrastructure multiplication - access to land and water, bypass roads, etc." In other words, the current "political nature" prevents Palestine from independently dictating its own food policy; the limitations imposed by the Israeli occupation violate the Palestinian right to food sovereignty,

resulting in an inability to significantly reduce an unacceptably high level of food insecurity. Thus, limitations that prevent Palestine from being food sovereign are the same factors that maintain a high level of food insecurity; likewise, the factors that cause food insecurity in Palestine are also responsible for preventing Palestine from reaching food sovereignty.

The Israeli occupation, with its myriad limitations on Palestinian action within Palestinian territory, plays a main role in denying Palestinians their right to food sovereignty and in maintaining an artificially high level of food insecurity. Israeli restrictions on Palestinian movement and water policy have a profound effect on Palestinian food policy. Likewise, land and property confiscation and destruction, unrestricted Israeli imports that flood Palestinian markets, and the environmental degradation of the occupation all act to deny Palestinians the ability to independently dictate their own food policies. These factors result in the dependence of Palestinians on outside forces in order to meet their nutritional requirements. Finally, the proliferation of unsustainable, emergency international aid projects that are intended to reduce food insecurity in the short term reinforce Palestinian dependence on international actors. While emergency food aid is essential to the survival of a great number of Palestinians, it must be paired with an attempt to remove various fundamental causes of food insecurity.

This agenda intends to examine the variety of obstacles on the road towards Palestinian food sovereignty. Each month of 2012 will feature different aspects that highlight the various Israeli policies that are taking away the Palestinian right to dictate food policy and achieve food sovereignty.



January

January

**Palestinian National
Authority's Food
Security Strategy**

Palestinian National Authority's Food Security Strategy

In the last few years the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) has published several documents defining its national development goals and strategies. Included in these documents are the Food Security Strategy and the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan. Both are revealing documents in that they frame national development through the prism of food sovereignty, without directly using this terminology. Both documents focus on factors that sustain the high levels of food insecurity throughout Palestine. As noted in the introduction, these same factors that encourage food insecurity are often also the obstacles to food sovereignty.

Importantly, the Food Security Strategy focuses on the bond between the Palestinian people and the land. Agriculture is the “foundation of the Palestinian nation and it is an integral component of Palestinian cultural, economic and social life.”¹ Likewise, the ideals of food sovereignty are based on the relationship between a people and their land. Without rehabilitating the links between the Palestinian people and the Palestinian land that have been broken or damaged by the Israeli policies of

the occupation, Palestinian food sovereignty will be impossible. The PNA has recognized that this connection must be fundamental in any developmental strategy.

Indeed, the vision of the Palestinian agriculture sector, as stated in the Strategy, reads like a modified definition of food sovereignty:

Sustainable and feasible agriculture, that is capable of achieving food security, competitive in the local and foreign markets through an optimal use of resources as part of comprehensive development, and cementing the bonds and sovereignty of Palestinians over their land, [is necessary] towards building the state.²

Moreover, the Food Security Strategy notes that a necessary component to achieving this vision is an end to the inequality of the occupation and a more just distribution and management of Palestinian resources. The Palestinian government, the Strategy notes, must commit to “[o]vercoming the distortions resulted from the occupation and enabling the Palestinians to exercise control over their resources.” To significantly reduce food insecurity, Palestinians must

1- Palestinian National Authority, Food Security Strategy, p. II

2- Palestinian National Authority, Food Security Strategy, p.VII

exercise full sovereign control not only over their resources, but also over their entire food policy.

Of course, overcoming the myriad obstacles is far easier said than done. The Palestinian Food Security Strategy takes the first step on this long road by identifying specific objectives that must be reached in order to achieve food sovereignty. Unsurprisingly, the goals of the Strategy work on two levels:

- In the short term, the PNA is looking to reduce food insecurity by providing aid and support to the food insecure as well as to farmers and food providers to ensure a stable flow of Palestinian food goods.

- In the long term, the PNA looks to identify and eliminate the obstacles to food sovereignty as part of the comprehensive state building program.

Moreover, the more encompassing Palestinian Reform and Development Plan also highlights these complimentary strategies: to ensure social protection and to develop the Palestinian agricultural sector. The former focuses on the need to care for the poor, including social security, food aid, free education, and free health care. The latter focuses on how developing the agricultural sector

can be a path to true sovereignty. Indeed, the National Plan calls for Palestinian food sovereignty:

“[Palestine must develop] sustained feasible agriculture capable of achieving food security and competing locally and internationally through the optimal use of resources as part of comprehensive development that secures the sovereignty of the Palestinian people over their land and resources, with the eventual aim of establishing a Palestinian state.”

The unique and difficult Palestinian situation that is created by the ongoing policies of the occupation has presented the PNA with a formidable task. The high levels of food insecurity in Palestine have forced the government to enact a number of unsustainable emergency projects, such as the provision of subsidies and food packages. These emergency projects undoubtedly aid those who are in need, but cannot eliminate the root cause of Palestinian food insecurity. Such emergency measures may even be considered as a necessary evil that helps to feed families, but may create a dependence on emergency aid (see August). Concurrently, though, the Food Security Strategy aims to increase Palestinian control over the many food resources throughout Palestine.

The dual prongs of the PNA's development strategies are thus complementary in that they both aim to provide much-needed emergency relief for those Palestinians who are currently food insecure while moving to overcome the underlying obstacles to food sovereignty in order to eliminate food insecurity and, consequently, the need for emergency food relief.

The need for true food sovereignty is great in Palestine. The most recent national developmental strategies of the PNA demonstrate that targeting food insecurity is necessary to ensure the health and well being of those most affected by the occupation. Yet the strategy also recognizes that for Palestine to truly eliminate food insecurity, drastic steps must be taken to remove the obstacles to Palestinian food sovereignty.

1 Sunday

الأحد

New Year's Day

2 Monday

الاثنين

NOTES

ملاحظات

JANUARY

كانون الثاني

S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

January
كانون الثاني

2012

3 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

4 Wednesday

الأربعاء

5 Thursday

الخميس

6 Friday

الجمعة

Epiphany

JANUARY

كانون الثاني

S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

January

كانون الثاني

7

Saturday

السبت

Christmas Day (Orthodox)

8

Sunday

الأحد

9

Monday

الاثنين

NOTES

ملاحظات

JANUARY														كانون الثاني																
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	F	S	S	M	T		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

10 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

11 Wednesday

الأربعاء

12 Thursday

الخميس

13 Friday

الجمعة

JANUARY

كانون الثاني

S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

January

كانون الثاني

14

Saturday

السبت

15

Sunday

الأحد

16

Monday

الاثنين

NOTES

ملاحظات

JANUARY													كانون الثاني																	
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	F	S	S	M	T		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

January
كانون الثاني

2012

17 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

18 Wednesday

الأربعاء

19 Thursday

الخميس

20 Friday

الجمعة

JANUARY

كانون الثاني

S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T
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January
كانون الثاني

21 Saturday السبت

22 Sunday الأحد

23 Monday الاثنين

NOTES ملاحظات

JANUARY													كانون الثاني																	
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	F	S	S	M	T		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

24 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

25 Wednesday

الأربعاء

26 Thursday

الخميس

27 Friday

الجمعة

JANUARY

كانون الثاني

S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

January

كانون الثاني

28

Saturday

السبت

29

Sunday

الأحد

30

Monday

الاثنين

NOTES

ملاحظات

JANUARY														كانون الثاني																
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	F	S	S	M	T		
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January
كانون الثاني

2012

31 Tuesday

الثلاثاء







KJRU
b
e
f

February
The Buffer Zone

The Buffer Zone

The so-called buffer zone in Gaza that is unilaterally imposed on the Gazans by Israel is ostensibly a response to Israeli security concerns. In reality, however, Israel's expansion of the buffer zone and other restricted areas poses a major threat to Palestinians living in Gaza, and greatly decreases the ability of Palestinians to reduce the shockingly high levels of food insecurity in the Gaza Strip. The buffer zone is a means of not only enforcing the four-year siege of Gaza, but it is an important means to further deny Palestinians true food sovereignty.

The buffer zone is a closed military zone maintained by Israel within the internationally-recognized borders of the Gaza Strip. Originally, a 50-meter buffer zone was established as part of the temporary security agreements between Palestine and Israel in 1995. In September 2000 Israel expanded the buffer zone to 150 meters from the border, and in May 2009 the zone was unilaterally expanded again to 300 meters. Additionally, there is what is called "high risk zone," which adds between 300-700 meters to this zone. The area is not properly demarcated, but instead is enforced by Israeli

gunfire. At its widest, in north Gaza, Palestinians who venture within two kilometers (1.2 miles) to the border risk being shot by Israeli soldiers.

The buffer zone and the extended "high risk" area together constitute over 27,000 dunums, or 30-40%, of Gaza's most viable agricultural land.¹ Overall, the buffer zone represents 17% of Gaza's entire landmass.² What was once bountiful land that produced olives, fruits, nuts, wheat, and barley is now no more than abandoned rubble and remnants of bulldozed agricultural fields.

Enforcement of the extended buffer zone is violent and often comes without warning. The predictable result is the death of many innocent Palestinians by Israeli fire for venturing into the unmarked zone. From January until September 2011, 27 people have been killed, 193 wounded, and 57 houses and establishments destroyed in these areas.³ Many of these deaths were of civilians simply harvesting

1- Palestinian Center for Human Rights, The Buffer Zone in the Gaza Strip, September 2011, pg. 1

2- OCHA, Between the Fence and a Hard Place, 2010, pg. 5

3- Palestinian Center for Human Rights, The Buffer Zone in the Gaza Strip, September 2011, pg. 2

their land or herding their animals in an area that is close to the buffer zone. An example of this occurred on September 12, 2010, when a 91-year-old Palestinian man and his two grandchildren were herding their sheep 700 meters from the perimeter fence near Beit Hanoun, in the north of the Gaza Strip.⁴ The Israel military fired at the old man and the two children, killing the three and also 30 of their sheep.⁵

The violent effects of the extended buffer zone are exacerbated by the extreme poverty in Gaza. The Israeli siege that limits goods entering and exiting the Strip, the loss of valuable property in the buffer zone, the Israeli imposed nautical siege (see July), and the destruction of Israeli military attacks have all increased the poverty rate, which has reached nearly 42%.⁶ Consequently, many Palestinians are forced to collect scrap metal and concrete from the ruins of buffer zone in order to sell and feed their families. The UNICEF-led working group on Children Affected by Armed

Conflict noted that in the last year, 26 Palestinian children were shot by Israeli troops, including 16 children that were outside the buffer zone, but inside the the “high risk area.”⁷

Israel also uses the “systematic levelling of farmland and the destruction of other private property” as a means to discourage Palestinians from entering the extended buffer zone. The total replacement costs imposed on the Palestinians by Israeli restrictions is conservatively estimated at US\$308 million, 90% of which are agricultural-related assets. Moreover, the loss of access to important agricultural lands has reduced the Palestinian annual yield by approximately 75,000 metric tons - around US\$50.2 million lost annually.⁸ Furthermore, 50% of residents living inside the extended buffer zone have reported completely losing their sources of income since 2000.⁹

Importantly, the great agricultural potential of the extended buffer zone is wasted as farmers

4- Diakonia, Within Range, September 2011, pg. 36

5- Palestinian Center for Human Rights, Annual Report, 2010, pg. 38

6- Unicef, Farming without Land, Fishing without Water: Gaza Agriculture Sector Struggles to Survive. 2010

7- Save the Children, Dying to Work: Gaza Children Risk their Lives to Earn a Living, 2011

8- OCHA, Between the Fence and a Hard Place, 2010, pg. 5

9- Unicef, Farming without Land, Fishing without Water: Gaza Agriculture Sector Struggles to Survive. 2010

are unable to tend to their land. Indeed, most Palestinian farmers have reported that their incomes have been reduced by more than a third due to the limitations of the buffer zone.¹⁰ In addition to the lost agricultural potential and the lost fishing potential, the independent food production capabilities in Gaza were destroyed during the 2008-09 Cast Lead invasion. Overall, 95% of industry and factories were destroyed during the Israeli attack, making processing food extremely difficult. The effects of the buffer zone and the destruction of Cast Lead left around 48% of Gaza agricultural land out of production.¹¹ As a result, 80% of Gazans are dependent on international aid

handouts,¹² and 61% are food insecure.¹³

The buffer zone and the accompanying 'high risk area' are a means to deny Palestinians the right to food sovereignty. Clearly, by blocking Palestinians from using their agricultural land and thus keeping the majority of the Gazan population food insecure, Israel is effectively blocking Palestine from becoming food sovereign. The various levels of Israeli control over Palestinian food resources in Gaza ensure that the Gazan people will continue to struggle with food insecurity until they are free to maximize the Gazan agricultural potential and to independently dictate food policy.

10- OCHA, *Between the Fence and a Hard Place*, 2010, pg. 5

11- Unicef, *Farming without Land, Fishing without Water: Gaza Agriculture Sector Struggles to Survive*. 2010

12- Diakonia, *Within Range*, September 2011, pg. 31

13- Unicef, *Farming without Land, Fishing without Water: Gaza Agriculture Sector Struggles to Survive*. 2010





Anne Paq/Activestills.org

1 Wednesday

الأربعاء

2 Thursday

الخميس

3 Friday

الجمعة

FEBRUARY

شباط

W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29

February

شباط

4

Saturday

السبت

World Cancer Day

Mawlid Al Nabi (Birth of Prophet Mohamed)

5

Sunday

الأحد

6

Monday

الاثنين

NOTES

ملاحظات

FEBRUARY																								شباط				
W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29

February
شباط

2012

7 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

8 Wednesday

الأربعاء

9 Thursday

الخميس

10 Friday

الجمعة

FEBRUARY

شباط

W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29

February

شباط

11 Saturday السبت

12 Sunday الأحد

13 Monday الاثنين

NOTESملاحظات

FEBRUARYشباط

W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29

February
شباط

2012

14 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

15 Wednesday

الأربعاء

16 Thursday

الخميس

17 Friday

الجمعة

FEBRUARY

شباط

W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29

February

شباط

18

Saturday

السبت

19

Sunday

الأحد

20

Monday

الاثنين

World Day of Social Justice

NOTES

ملاحظات

FEBRUARY																								شباط				
W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29

February
شباط

2012

21 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

22 Wednesday

الأربعاء

23 Thursday

الخميس

24 Friday

الجمعة

FEBRUARY

شباط

W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29

February

شباط

25 Saturday السبت

Massacre of the Ibrahimi mosque in Hebron-1994

26 Sunday الأحد

27 Monday الاثنين

NOTESملاحظات

FEBRUARY																								شباط				
W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29

February
شباط

2012

28 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

29 Wednesday

الأربعاء





March

March
**The Jordan
Valley**

The Jordan Valley

The Jordan Valley is the stretch of land on the eastern border of the West Bank, running along the Jordan River. It encompasses an area of about 2,400 square kilometers, which is 28.5% of the total area of the West Bank. Historically, there had been no geographical or demographic divide separating the Valley from the rest of the West Bank. Between 1948 and 1967, over 320,000 Palestinians lived in the Valley as nomadic herders, Bedouin, and farmers, moving freely to, from, and within the Valley.¹ Because of the arable land and the abundance of natural water sources, the Jordan Valley has been conducive to a thriving agriculture industry, which has earned it the designation of the “breadbasket of Palestine.” Indeed, in 1967 around 80% of Palestinian agricultural production was for export² and the agricultural sector represented over 53% of Palestinian GDP.³

Today, though, the Jordan Valley looks drastically different. The agricultural potential of this region remains high, but Israeli land confiscation, combined with a sophisticated series of restrictions on Palestinian movement, construction, and water usage, have decimated not only the agricultural output, but also the traditional Palestinian lifestyle in this region.

Almost 95% of the Jordan Valley is designated as Area C, meaning that nearly the entire area is under full Israeli military and civil control. Overall, due to settlements and military zones, 77.5% of the land in the Jordan Valley is completely off-limits to Palestinians, leaving very little room left for the Palestinian population to reside or cultivate.⁴ Even on the land that Palestinians still control, Israel prevents any type of development. It is nearly impossible for Palestinians living in Area C to receive the proper permits to build schools, houses, agricultural buildings, or other infrastructure. In other words, most Palestinian construction in the Jordan Valley is illegal and therefore subject to Israeli demolition, which intimidates many Palestinians from trying to

1- Eye on Jordan Valley, MA'AN Development Center, 2010, p. 26

2- Butterfield, D., Issac, J., Kubursi, A., & Spencer, S. (2000). Impacts of Water and Export Market Restrictions on Palestinian Agriculture, Retrieved March 19, 2011

3- Applied Research Institute - Jerusalem, Socio-Economic and Food Security Atlas, 2010 pg. 34.

4- B'tselem, Dispossession and Exploitation, 2011 pg. 26

develop in the area in the first place. In fact, between 2000 and 2007, only 91 out of 1,624 of Palestinian construction permit requests (6%) were authorized by the Israeli military authority.⁵ Consequently, Palestinians are unable to expand villages, improve farming equipment, repair houses, or build educational facilities without the threat of demolition.

Moreover, Israel has used water as a weapon against the Palestinian people. Denied the ability to construct new, deeper wells, Palestinians are only able to access the shallowest parts of the groundwater under the West Bank. Deep Israeli wells and an unlimited water flow to settlements in the Jordan Valley has caused the overall level of ground water to drop, resulting in many shallow Palestinian wells and natural streams drying up. Indeed, the contrast between Palestinian and Israeli settler water usage is startling. On average, Palestinians consume around 50-70 liters of water per day. In the Jordan Valley this number reaches as low as 10 liters per day. Comparatively, settlers in the Beka'ot settlement in the Jordan Valley, use upwards of 401

liters per person per day. In the Jordan Valley, Israeli policies have stunted any type of development and have, in fact, turned back the clock. There is less Palestinian agricultural production today than in 1967, leading to a far smaller contribution to GDP (53.5% in 1967 compared to 6.3% today).⁶ Before the occupation began 43 years ago, there were 774 working agricultural wells used by Palestinians, while today there are only 328. Perhaps most importantly, Israeli policies restricting the lives of Palestinians in the Valley have greatly affected the demographics of the area: of the 320,000 Palestinians living in the Jordan Valley in 1967, there are merely 52,000 today.⁷

Of those Palestinians who still call the Jordan Valley home, life is far from easy. Around 55-79% of of the Bedouin and herder communities are food insecure, as opposed to the Palestinian average of 25%. For these communities, food expenditures reach as high as 62% of household income, as well. This has caused 93.3% of children in these communities to eat fewer than the daily recommended

5- BBC News, West Bank Building 'Bias' Condemned, Retrieved January 5, 2011,

6- Portland Trust, Palestinian Economic Bulletin, 2011 pg. 3

7- MA'AN Development Center, Eye on Jordan Valley, 2010, pg. 26

number of meals per day; 9.1% of children in these communities eat just one meal per day. Predictably, there is a prevalence of underweight and stunted children between the ages of six months and five years, reaching 15.3% and 28.5% respectively.⁸

Despite the extreme restrictions and limitations imposed on Palestinians, the agricultural potential of the Jordan Valley remains immense. The World Bank released a report in 2009, claiming that “with unconstrained water availability...the Jordan Valley alone would add over \$57 million annually and over 12,500 jobs in the agricultural sector.” They also concluded that over \$400 million and 96,000 jobs are lost annually in the occupied Palestinian territories due to the non-development of irrigated agriculture, much of which is in the Jordan Valley.⁹ Currently, the Israeli restrictions on Palestinian movement and access play a major role in the current Palestinian agricultural depression. In the Jordan Valley alone, there are 60,000 dunums of arable agricultural that are unavailable to Palestinians. Overall, in Palestine, only 247,000 of the 708,000

dunums of irrigable lands are currently in use by Palestinians.

Given the freedom to access all the Palestinian land of the Jordan Valley, and given access to a fair share of water, the Palestinian agricultural sector could soon return to its full potential. The Jordan Valley remains the center of Palestine’s agricultural production, yet the policies of the occupation directly inhibit the fulfillment of Palestinian food sovereignty. Given the freedom to produce, Palestinians could easily meet their food needs and once again export food, rather than be dependent on the charities of the international community. The path to Palestinian food sovereignty runs through the Jordan Valley. Yet the Israeli restrictions and methods of control that have come to define life in the Valley are preventing Palestinians from attaining this right.

Over 67% of communities in the Jordan Valley rely on cesspits and septic tanks that are unsealed or unlined.

***[MA’AN Development Center
“Restricted Access.” 2011]***

8- UNRWA-UNICEF, Food Security and Nutrition Survey of Herding Communities in Area C, 2010 pg. 7-8

9- The World Bank Group, Assessment of Restrictions on Palestinian Water Sector Development, 2009 pg. 27

2012



Photo by Jamal Arouri

1 Thursday

الخميس

2 Friday

الجمعة

MARCH

آذار

T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

March
أذار

3 Saturday

السيت

4 Sunday

الأحد

5 Monday

الأثنين

NOTES

ملاحظات

MARCH

آذا

T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

March
أذار

2012

6

Tuesday

الثلاثاء

7

Wednesday

الأربعاء

8

Thursday

الخميس

International Women's Day

9

Friday

الجمعة

MARCH

أذار

T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S							
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March
أذار

10 Saturday

السبت

11 Sunday

الأحد

12 Monday

الأثنين

NOTES

ملاحظات

MARCH

آذار

T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

March
أذار

2012

13 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

14 Wednesday

الأربعاء

15 Thursday

الخميس

16 Friday

الجمعة

MARCH

أذار

T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S							
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March
أذار

17 Saturday

السيت

18 Sunday

الأحد

19 Monday

الأثنين

NOTES

ملاحظات

MARCH

آذار

T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
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20 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

21 Wednesday

الأربعاء

- International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.
- 21-28 Week of Solidarity with the Peoples Struggling against Racism and Racial Discrimination.
- Mother's Day.

22 Thursday

الخميس

World Water Day

23 Friday

الجمعة

MARCH

أذار

T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

March

أذار

24 Saturday

السبت

25 Sunday

الأحد

26 Monday

الأثنين

NOTES

ملاحظات

MARCH

آذا

T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
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March
أذار

2012

27 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

28 Wednesday

الأربعاء

29 Thursday

الخميس

30 Friday

الجمعة

- Palestinian Land Day-1976

MARCH


أذار

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March
أذار

31 Saturday

السبت



2012







April
Water

Water

Before the beginning of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, Palestinians were able to access water from the Jordan River, the Dead Sea, and from natural springs and wells that reached the mountain aquifer in the West Bank and the Coastal aquifer in Gaza. Today, for Palestinians, the water situation has deteriorated to near emergency levels. In the West Bank, continued expansion of settlements has resulted in the appropriation of many important water resources and assets. In Gaza, the complete blockade of the Strip has caused in severe pollution problems, while repeated Israeli incursions have destroyed most of the water infrastructure. Consequently, Palestinians are deprived of the water they need for cooking, cleaning, and caring for crops and animals.

The two historic, main sources of water for the Palestinians in the West Bank are now shared with Israel. The groundwater located in the Mountain Aquifer is split between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, with Israel receiving 83%. The other shared source is the Jordan River and

its tributaries, including the Sea of Galilee. Immediately after the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1967, Israel issued military orders - specifically, numbers 92, 158 and 291 - that cancelled all existing water agreements in the area, put Palestinian water usage at the mercy of the Israeli military administration, and completely denied Palestinians access to the Jordan River. Today, Israel receives over one-third of its water from the Jordan River and its tributaries. Palestinians receive no water from this once significant source.

The only source of fresh water for Gaza is the Coastal Aquifer. The water in this aquifer is no longer suitable for consumption due to high salinity levels and an extreme chemical imbalance caused by pollution. The blockade on Gaza has made it nearly impossible to find the materials necessary to construct a water treatment plant or even to repair the existing damaged water network parts. Repeated incursions by the Israeli army, particularly the Cast Lead invasion of 2008-2009, have left the water network in Gaza in tatters. Denied the ability to find an alternative source of water or to repair the damage to the current water network, few

Palestinians in Gaza have access to a healthy level of water. In September 2011, it was reported that only 40% of Palestinians in Gaza receive water, for a 6-8 hour period, once every three days. Only 10% of the Gaza population has access to water every day.¹ Yet even the water that is delivered to Gazan households is inadequate. Over half of all households' water does not meet the WHO quality standards (in 9 of 15 localities) and shows bacteriological contamination in household drinking water (in 8 of 15 localities.)² In the al-Zarqa neighborhood of Gaza City, over 50% of Palestinians suffer from waterborne diseases, particularly from diarrheal diseases. Over 40% of families in Gaza have one or more children that have some form of skin disease, 50% have a child with diarrhea, and 45% have children with parasitic infections.

In fact, the average water consumption rates for all Palestinians are drastically lower than the recommended rate of the WHO. The WHO recommends 100 liters per day per person. Palestinians have

access to only 50-70 liters per day. Moreover, in the most isolated areas of Area C in the West Bank and in various places in the Gaza Strip, Palestinians may not have access to more than 10-15 liters of water each day. Israelis, on the other hand, consume an average of 282 liters per person per day. This discriminatory gap grows more in the Jordan Valley, where access to water is essential for agricultural production. The town of Tubas, for example, and the Israeli settlement of Baka'ot are both agricultural communities that depend on ample water sources. In Beka'ot, Israeli settlers consume 401 liters of water each day, whereas water consumption by the Palestinian people in Tubas has been reduced to 30 liters per day.

Perhaps even more upsetting is the role that Israel's national water company, Mekerot, plays in the Palestinian territories. Mekerot extracts water from the eastern basin of the Mountain Aquifer and sells the water throughout Israel and Palestine. Over 90% of this basin is filled with water that falls on the West Bank, yet Mekerot still has the authority to sell Palestinian water back to Palestinians. Furthermore, when Palestinian

1- WASH Cluster oPt Monthly Situation Report, Number 39, September 30, 2011.

2- WASH Cluster oPt Monthly Situation Report, Number 38, August 31, 2011.

April

wells dry up due to over-consumption by nearby Israeli settlements, they are forced to purchase water from the Israeli company at an elevated cost that is not imposed on Israelis. For some Palestinians, water purchased from Mekerot can cost up to 37.6 NIS per cubic meter. Israelis in settlements outside the town of Yatta, near Hebron, for example, pay 6 NIS per cubic meter. Palestinians in the nearby Palestinian town of Amniyr pay 35 NIS for the same amount of water.

Just as Palestinians in Gaza watch helplessly as Israeli aerial attacks and ground incursions result in the destruction of precious water assets, those who live in the West Bank must endure the demolition of important water sources by Israel. Palestinians in Area C are not permitted to build even simple structures such as wells or water collection tanks without Israeli permission. As Israeli permission is nearly impossible to attain, Palestinians often revert to building illegally and assuming the risk of demolition orders. Since 1967, Israel has demolished 140 Palestinian water pumps and

has confiscated another 162 Palestinian agricultural water projects. Between June 2009 and June 2011, Israel demolished 100 Palestinian water structures and confiscated another 27. From January to July 2011, Israel demolished 33 water assets, including 20 cisterns.³

Without adequate access to clean water, Palestinians will continue to struggle. The low quality and quantity of water available to Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza continue to negatively affect the ability of Palestinians to grow and develop. Agriculturally, the insufficient amounts of water have forced farmers to begin using waste water and other types of dirty tainted water to feed their crops, often resulting in unhealthy produce that cannot be safely consumed, significantly decreasing the production of the local agricultural sector.

3- WASH Cluster oPt Monthly Situation Report, Number 37, July 31, 2011.



2012

*Not being able to
maximize use of
Palestinian natural
resources cost the
Palestinian economy
US\$ 4.5 billion in 2010.*

*[ARJ "The Economic Costs of the
Israeli Occupation." 2011. P. II]*



1 Sunday

الأحد

2 Monday

الاثنين

- Israeli forces besieges Bethlehem's church of the Nativity-2002

NOTES

ملاحظات

APRIL

نيسان

S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M							
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3 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

*Israeli forces begin a 7-day assault
on the Jenin refugee Camp-2002*

4 Wednesday

الأربعاء

5 Thursday

الخميس

Palestinian Child Day

6 Friday

الجمعة

- Good Friday

April

نيسان

7

Saturday

السبت

World Health Day

8

Sunday

الأحد

Palm Sunday
Easter Sunday

9

Monday

الاثنين

Deir Yassin Massacre-1948

NOTES

ملاحظات

APRIL

نيسان

S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M							
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10 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

11 Wednesday

الأربعاء

12 Thursday

الخميس

13 Friday

الجمعة

April
نيسان

14 Saturday السبت

15 Sunday الأحد

16 Monday الاثنين

NOTESملاحظات

APRIL

نيسان

S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M							
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17 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

Palestinian Prisoners' Day

18 Wednesday

الأربعاء

19 Thursday

الخميس

20 Friday

الجمعة

APRIL

نيسان

S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M
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April
نيسان

21 Saturday السبت

22 Sunday الأحد

23 Monday الاثنين

NOTESملاحظات

APRIL

نيسان

S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M							
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24 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

25 Wednesday

الأربعاء

26 Thursday

الخميس

27 Friday

الجمعة

APRIL

نيسان

S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M							
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April
نيسان

28 Saturday السبت

29 Sunday الأحد

30 Monday الاثنين

NOTESملاحظات

APRIL																								نيسان					
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M							
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WGCY

May
**Movement
Restrictions**

Movement Restrictions

Israeli restrictions on Palestinian freedom of movement have become an unfortunate fact of life for Palestinians. The separation wall and hundreds of checkpoints and roadblocks in the West Bank, as well as the border wall, the accompanying buffer zone (see February) and the nautical limit (see July) in Gaza have made movement throughout Palestine nearly impossible. The right to movement within states is clearly stated in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, while the negative economic consequences of the Israeli system of closure are so drastic that the entire system violates the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.¹

In the West Bank, there are approximately 522 roadblocks and checkpoints, and a staggering 495 temporary “flying” checkpoints are set up each month. Palestinians are prohibited from using at least one entrance into 10 of the 11 major Palestinian cities, while the categorization of rural land as Area C has reduced

Palestinian access to 60% of the West Bank, including 95% of the Jordan Valley (see March). In the city of Hebron, 122 closures and obstacles isolate the old city from the rest of the Palestinian population, and East Jerusalem is only accessible to Jerusalem residents and the few Palestinians with Israeli work permits. Even then, Palestinians with valid permits are allowed to use only four of the sixteen checkpoints entering the city.²

The complete isolation of Gaza began in 1989 with the implementation of a magnetic permit system which denied access to Israel for many Gazans. At the beginning of the second Intifada, and again when Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, the closure of Gaza greatly intensified. Today, travel to Israel is incredibly limited, and only in highly exceptional cases are Gazan residents allowed to travel to the West Bank. Likewise, movement from Gaza to Egypt is still restricted. The progression of the closure system has been drastic: in the summer of 2000, around 26,000 Palestinians crossed into Israel each day

1- B'tselem, *Restriction of Movement* supplement, 2011.

2- OCHA, *Movement and Access in the West Bank factsheet*, 2011.

through the Erez crossing in the north of the Gaza Strip. Today, an average of only 95 people -- mostly international aid workers -- cross through Erez each day.³

Within Gaza, movement is greatly restricted by the buffer zone, which consumes 17% of the entire strip and 30-40% of Gaza's most viable agricultural land.⁴

These closures have had an enormous impact on the Palestinian economy. The movement restrictions have caused an increase in unemployment and poverty rates as Palestinians are increasingly unable to travel to work. This is particularly true in Gaza, where the siege has dramatically cut the number of Palestinians working in Israel, while East Jerusalem has been largely closed off from the majority of the Palestinian population. Moreover, transportation costs have greatly increased, reducing the profits of merchants. Moving goods from one Palestinian town to another has become "expensive, uncertain, and inefficient,"

3- Gisha, *Unraveling the Closure of Gaza*, 2010 pg. 3.

4- OCHA, *Between the Fence and a Hard Place*, 2010, pg. 5.

resulting in a division of the national economy into a number of smaller local economies with little interaction.⁵

Restrictions in Area C across the West Bank and in the buffer zone in Gaza have greatly damaged the Palestinian farming sector. Increased Israeli demolitions, a lack of clean water and increased transportation costs have reduced the agricultural sector's relative importance to the Palestinian economy. In 1967, the agricultural sector represented over 53% of Palestinian GDP;⁶ in 2008 the agricultural sector reached a low of 4.6% of Palestinian GDP and 4.8% in 2009.⁷ Within the agricultural sector, the important olive industry has been struck particularly hard. Olive groves account for nearly 80% of cultivated land in Palestine⁸ and nearly 20% of total agricultural

5- B'tselem, *Restriction of Movement supplement*, 2011.

6- Butterfield, D., Isaac, J., Kubursi, A., & Spencer, S, *Impacts of Water and Export Market Restrictions on Palestinian Agriculture*, 2011.

7- Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, *Overview of the Palestinian Economy*, 2010, pg. 6

8- OCHA, *The Olive Harvest in the West Bank and Gaza* October 2006.

output.⁹ To date, Israel has uprooted over 1.2 million Palestinian olive trees, including 400,000 that were uprooted in Gaza during operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009¹⁰ and thousands more that were uprooted during the construction of the separation wall in the West Bank. The annual olive yield, in fact, decreased from 160,000 tons in 2007 to 34,000 tons in 2008.¹¹

As a consequence of the complex closure system throughout Palestine, the real per capita income has drastically fallen: in 1999, Palestinians made US\$1,621, but they made only US\$1,284 in 2008. Likewise,

the per capita share of the GNP dropped from US\$1,959 to US\$1,690, a drop that is more significant when looked at in real terms, going from US\$1,707 to US\$1,108. Palestinians, in other words, are becoming significantly poorer as a result of the increase in movement restrictions. Importantly, the Israeli restrictions have greatly damaged the Palestinian agricultural sector, which has historically been at the heart of the Palestinian economy. The movement and access restrictions are denying Palestinians the ability to feed themselves while also systematically destroying the Palestinian economy. Indeed, removal of these illegal restrictions would greatly reduce food insecurity and help move Palestine significantly closer to food sovereignty.

9- World Bank, *Brief Overview of the Olive and Olive Oil Sector in the Palestinian Territories*

10- *Electronic Intifada, For us, Olive Trees are a Matter of Resistance*, 2009.

11- *ePalestine, Real per Capita Income of Palestine Plunges*, 2010.



May
أيار

2012

1 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

International Labor Day

2 Wednesday

الأربعاء

3 Thursday

الخميس

World Press Freedom Day

4 Friday

الجمعة

MAY

أيار

T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T
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May
أيار

5 Saturday السبت

6 Sunday الأحد

7 Monday الاثنين

NOTESملاحظات

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May
أيار

2012

8

Tuesday

الثلاثاء

9

Wednesday

الأربعاء

10

Thursday

الخميس

11

Friday

الجمعة

MAY

أيار

T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T
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May
أيار

12 Saturday السبت

13 Sunday الأحد

14 Monday الاثنين

NOTES ملاحظات

MAY																												أيار		
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May
أيار

2012

15 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

Palestinian Nakkba
'Catastrophe'-1948

16 Wednesday

الأربعاء

17 Thursday

الخميس

18 Friday

الجمعة

MAY

أيار

T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T
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19 Saturday السبت

20 Sunday الأحد

21 Monday الأثنين

World Day for Cultural Diversity
for Dialogue and Development

NOTES ملاحظات

May
أيار

2012

22 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

23 Wednesday

الأربعاء

24 Thursday

الخميس

25 Friday

الجمعة

Week of solidarity with peoples of all
colonial territories fighting for freedom,
independence and human rights.

MAY

أيار

T W T F				S S M T W T F							S S M T W T F							S S M T W T												
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May
أيار

26 Saturday السبت

27 Sunday الأحد

28 Monday الأثنين

Palestinian Charter
Declaration

NOTES ملاحظات

May
أيار

2012

29 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

30 Wednesday

الأربعاء

31 Thursday

الخميس







בס
מס

June
**Control of
Palestinian
Borders**

Control of Palestinian Borders

Prior to 1967, 80% of the agricultural goods produced in the Jordan Valley were exported. Adequate amounts of food were sold on local markets while farmers were still able to make additional profits by exporting excess goods. Today, however, Palestinian-produced food and goods struggle to even remain competitive on the local market. While trade represents 85% of Palestinian GDP, 90% of this trade is with Israel.¹

The difference between the trade policy of Palestine before the beginning of the occupation and today is obvious. Complete Israeli control over Palestinian borders has left Palestinian trade policy nearly completely at the mercy of Israel. Despite some initial agreements concerning autonomous Palestinian trade made during the Oslo negotiations in the 1990s, Palestinian trade policy is effectively dictated by Israel. In fact, Israeli control over Palestinian borders and trade

is so encompassing that the World Bank has noted that the Palestinian economy is “dependent” on Israel’s trade policy.²

That Palestine trades significant amounts with Israel is not be a problem in itself, but recent changes within the Israeli market and closures justified by security concerns have significantly reduced Palestinian access to the Israeli market and thus, without reliable alternatives, have weakened the export industry. Along with growing Palestinian dependence on the Israeli market, the closures of the Israeli market led the World Bank to conclude that future Palestinian growth “will depend upon Palestinian enterprises being able to reach beyond Israel and access new markets in the rest of the world.”³ Unfortunately, Israel has made itself the ultimate conduit of Palestinian goods to the rest of the world. Most

1- World Bank, *West Bank and Gaza Palestinian Trade: West Bank Routes*, 2008, pg. i.

2- World Bank, *West Bank and Gaza Palestinian Trade: West Bank Routes*, 2008, pg. 2.

3- World Bank, *West Bank and Gaza Palestinian Trade: West Bank Routes*, 2008, pg. i.

Palestinian exports to the rest of the world travel through Ben Gurion airport in Tel Aviv, and even the limited exports that are sent via Jordan and Egypt are subject to Israeli restrictions.

Israeli domination of all aspects of Palestinian imports and exports was imposed as a result of years of planned integration of the Palestinian and Israeli economies. The result was a “legal and economic framework for trade within the Occupied Palestinian Territories that ensure[d] Israel’s control over trade growth and policy.”⁴ In fact, the World Bank states that all trade decisions -- including tariffs, levies, and technical standards of trade -- that were adopted by Israel were applied to Palestine without Palestinian input. Essentially, by treating Palestine as an extension of Israel proper, Israel has been able to export its goods freely to the Palestinian market without concern for international tariffs.⁵ Moreover, by controlling imports into Palestine, Israel

has been able to flood the Palestinian market with Israeli goods while prohibiting the import of cheaper Arab alternatives.

The most modern form of Israeli domination of Palestinian trade policy was institutionalized in the supposedly temporary Oslo Accords and its subsequent Protocols in 1993-94. One of the most important agreements is the Protocol on Economic Relations between Israel and the PLO (“Paris Protocol”), which allowed the PLO small pockets of economic sovereignty in determining tariffs on specific products.⁶ Yet even this small measure of Palestinian sovereignty has been grossly violated by Israel since it retains a veto power over Palestinian export and import proposals. In addition, Israel is still completely in control of imports into Palestine and prohibits the Palestinian National Authority from establishing its own independent policies, such as having lower tariffs on imports

4- Union Aid Abroad-APHEDA, *Food Sovereignty and the Occupied Palestinian Territories*, 2010, pg. 19.

5- World Bank, *West Bank and Gaza Palestinian Trade: West Bank Routes*, 2008, pg. 1-4.

6- Union Aid Abroad-APHEDA, *Food Sovereignty and the Occupied Palestinian Territories*, 2010, pg. 19.

than Israel.⁷ Consequently, Palestine is unable to dictate the terms of its trade policy.

The detrimental consequences of Israel's domination over Palestinian trade exemplifies why trade policy control is so fundamental to food sovereignty. The inability to tax Israeli imports or freely trade with other countries has prevented the Palestinian economy from growing independently from Israel. In this way, Israeli control of the Palestinian trade policy has greatly stunted real Palestinian economic development.

The lack of an independent Palestinian trade policy has inhibited growth in the Palestinian agricultural sector in particular. The lack of economic growth throughout Palestine and the inability of the Palestinian agricultural sector to reach its potential have contributed to the high levels of poverty, unemployment, and food insecurity. Moreover, the prevalence of Israeli imports has ensured that this economic dependence will continue. An

7- *ibid.*

independent trade policy would provide an immense boost to the Palestinian economy and allow the agricultural sector to develop enough to independently and domestically reduce poverty and food insecurity.

Due to Israeli restrictions, Palestinian import and export procedures far longer than Israeli procedures: Palestinian export procedures are twice as long (23 days to 11 days) and import procedures are 4 times as long (40 days to 10 days.)

[ARIJ "The Economic Costs of the Israeli Occupation." 2011. P. 10]

Israeli barriers to Palestinian imports and exports increase the cost of Palestinian transactions by around 40%.

[IRIN News "Israel chokes Palestinian trade, says UN study." 2011.]



Photo by Jamal Arouri

1 Friday

الجمعة



JUNE

حزيران

F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
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June
حزيران

2 Saturday

السبت

Establishment of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO)-1964

3 Sunday

الأحد

4 Monday

الاثنين

International Day of Innocent
Victims of aggression

NOTES

ملاحظات

JUNE														حزيران															
F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S						
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5 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

- World Environment Day
- 2nd Arab-Israeli war and annual commemoration of occupation of West Bank, Gaza Strip, east Jerusalem and Golan Heights-1967

6 Wednesday

الأربعاء

7 Thursday

الخميس

8 Friday

الجمعة

JUNE

حزيران

F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
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June
حزيران

9 Saturday

السيت

10 Sunday

الأحد

11 Monday

الأثنين

NOTES

ملاحظات

JUNE

حزيران

F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
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June
حزيران

2012

12 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

13 Wednesday

الأربعاء

14 Thursday

الخميس

15 Friday

الجمعة

JUNE

حزيران

F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
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June
حزيران

16 Saturday السبت
Isra' wal-miraj

17 Sunday الأحد
World Day to Combat
Desertification and Drought

18 Monday الاثنين

NOTES ملاحظات

19 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

20 Wednesday

الأربعاء

World Refugee Day

21 Thursday

الخميس

22 Friday

الجمعة

JUNE

حزيران

F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
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June
حزيران

23 Saturday السبت

24 Sunday الأحد

25 Monday الاثنين

NOTES ملاحظات

JUNE																												حزيران		
F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	

26 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

- International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking
- International Day in Support of Victims of Torture

27 Wednesday

الأربعاء

28 Thursday

الخميس

illegal Annexation of East
Jerusalem by Israel-1980

29 Friday

الجمعة

JUNE

حزيران

F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
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June
حزيران

30 Saturday

السبت

2012







July
Gaza
Nautical Limit

Gaza Nautical Limit

The Oslo Accords, signed between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Israel in 1993, included a specific agreement stipulating that Palestinian fishermen were allowed to sail and fish up to 20 nautical miles from shore. Yet the Israeli navy has continuously reduced the nautical limit for Gazan fishermen. Despite the Oslo agreements, the Israeli navy maintained a nautical limit of only 12 miles throughout the 1990s. After the evacuation of Israeli settlements and the subsequent redeployment of Israeli forces to the periphery of the Gaza Strip in 2005, the limit was reduced by half to six nautical miles. In June 2007, this distance was halved again to three nautical miles, where it has remained since.¹

The navy employs many violent means of enforcing this blockade, including firing at or ramming small Palestinian fishing boats.² In 2010 alone, seven fishermen were killed, and four wounded in 28 documented attacks by the Israeli navy. On September 24, 2010, for example, Mohammad Baker and three of his cousins

sailed two kilometers (1.08 nautical miles) off the coast near Gaza City. Despite being within the Israeli-imposed nautical limit -- and nearly 19 nautical miles closer than the mutually agreed upon limit of the Oslo Accords -- an Israeli gunboat intercepted the fishing boat. Stopping around 100 meters from the Palestinians, the navy vessel started firing without any warning. The unprovoked attack lasted nearly ten minutes. Mohammad was killed by the first shots, and his cousin, Kamal Nasser, died at the hospital from his wounds.³

Apart from the obvious dangers it poses to Palestinians, this limit has had a severe impact on the annual Palestinian fishing yield. In 1998, Gaza fishermen were able to catch 3,625,863 kilograms of 30 types of fish.⁴ In 2009, Gaza fishermen were only able to catch 1,524,913 kilograms of fish, a nearly 60% decrease. Moreover, this reduced haul consisted of only nine types of fish.⁵ It is estimated that, as

1- Palestinian Center for Human Rights, *Annual Report*, 2010, pg. 39.

2- Palestinian Center for Human Rights, *Annual Report*, 2010, pg. 39.

3- Palestinian Center for Human Rights, *Annual Report*, 2010, pg. 39.

4- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, *Amount of Fish Production in Gaza Strip by Species and Year (kg)*.

5- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, *Amount of Fish Production in Gaza Strip by Species and Year (kg)*.

a consequence of the Israeli restrictions, the Palestinian fishing yield has decreased by 7,000 metric tons, a loss of around US\$26.5 million over five years.⁶ In other words, the unilaterally imposed limitations on Palestinian water rights is having a considerable and measurable negative impact on both the total Palestinian yield and the diversity of fish caught.

Clearly, the nautical restrictions are greatly limiting the ability of Palestinians to maximize their fishing production. Palestinians are prevented from reaching 85% of the fishing areas allotted to them in the Oslo Accords.⁷ As Palestinians are lethally prevented from reaching deeper waters, they are forced to fish the areas closest to shore that are naturally inhabited by few species. Moreover, the lack of waste treatment facilities in Gaza (see September) as well as the great demographic concentration of the small area has resulted in the use of the ocean as a means to dispose waste. In addition to solid waste, 16 sewage outfalls pump somewhere between 50-

80 million liters of sewage,⁸ or nearly 80% of all Gazan waste water,⁹ into the sea everyday. The sewage which festers close to the shore or is pushed north by currents drastically limits the Palestinian fishing ability. The fish that do not migrate away from the pollution source are small in number and typically very unhealthy.

Finally, in addition to smaller populations of fish living close to the Gazan shore, the Israeli blockade forces the Palestinian fishermen to greatly over fish the area, preventing the fish population from reproducing at a fast enough rate. With the Israeli-imposed buffer zone (see February) prohibiting the use of 30% of Gaza's agricultural land, Palestinians rely on the fishing industry for survival. This dependence means that the Palestinian fishing industry has no choice but to continue the unsustainable practice of overfishing close to shore.

Clearly, with the Israeli-imposed limitations on Gaza's fishing sector, Palestinians are unable to maximize the

6- OCHA, *Between a Fence and a Hard Place*, 2010 pg. 6.

7- OCHA, *Between a Fence and a Hard Place*, 2010 pg. 5.

8- Perdana Foundation, *Gaza Sewage Polluting Regionally*, 2011.

9- Dr. Abed al-Fattah Nazmi Abed Rabu, *Wastewater and Marine Environment in the Gaza Strip*, 2009, pg. 4.


fishing potential sustainably and in an environmentally-friendly way. Moreover, the livelihood of many Gazans greatly depends on the fishing sector. Due to the inability to create an independent Palestinian fishing policy, the Red Cross has reported that 90% of Gazan fishermen live in poverty, with the poorest earning only US\$100 per month.¹⁰ The Israeli naval blockade is greatly restricting the ability of Palestinians to meet the food needs of the Gazan population. Though the Palestinian National Authority has intervened in an attempt to alleviate the suffering by offering compensation and micro-finance loans to fishermen,¹¹ the inability to maximize the fishing potential of Gazan waters has helped contribute to an ever-increasing level of food insecurity in Gaza, reaching 52% in 2010.¹²

10- International Committee of the Red Cross, Gaza Closure: Not Another Year, 2010.

11- Palestinian National Authority Ministry of Agriculture, Agriculture Sector Strategy 2011-13, 2011, pg. XVIII.

12- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey, 2010 pg. 7.

Like in the West Bank, this unacceptable level of food insecurity is symptomatic of the Israeli prevention of Palestinian food sovereignty. Free from Israeli restrictions, Palestinians would be able to greatly reduce the food insecurity by, among other measures, dictating their own fishing policies and reaching much greater annual yields by pursuing more abundant and healthier fish populations farther from the coast.



July
تموز

2012



July
تموز

In 2010, the Palestinian economy has lost over US\$1.9 billion dollars as a direct result of the siege.

[ARIJ "The Economic Costs of the Israeli Occupation." 2011. P. 4]

1 Sunday

الأحد

2 Monday

الاثنين

NOTES

ملاحظات

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JULY

تموز

S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T
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July
تموز

2012

3 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

4 Wednesday

الأربعاء

5 Thursday

الخميس

6 Friday

الجمعة

JULY

تموز

S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T
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7 Saturday السبت

8 Sunday الأحد

9 Monday الأثنين

- Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Israeli Apartheid Wall-2004

- Palestinian civil society issue a call for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) against Israel until it complies with international law-2005

NOTESملاحظات

10 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

11 Wednesday

الأربعاء

World Population Day

12 Thursday

الخميس

13 Friday

الجمعة

JULY

تموز

S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T
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July
تموز

14 Saturday السبت

15 Sunday الأحد

16 Monday الاثنين

NOTES ملاحظات

JULY																												تموز		
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	F	S	S	M	T		
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July
تموز

2012

17 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

18 Wednesday

الأربعاء

*International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of
Crime of Apartheid comes into
force-1976*

19 Thursday

الخميس

20 Friday

الجمعة

JULY

تموز

S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T
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21 Saturday السبت

First Day of Ramadan

22 Sunday الأحد

23 Monday الاثنين

NOTES ملاحظات

July
تموز

2012

24 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

25 Wednesday

الأربعاء

26 Thursday

الخميس

27 Friday

الجمعة

JULY

تموز

S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T							
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July
تموز

28 Saturday السبت

29 Sunday الأحد

30 Monday الاثنين

NOTES ملاحظات

JULY																												تموز		
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	F	S	S	M	T		
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July
تموز

2012

31 Tuesday

الثلاثاء



Anne Paq/Activestills.org

JULY

تموز

S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T
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August
International
Aid

International Aid

For the past several years, Palestine has been among the top global recipients of international humanitarian aid. Up until 2010, approximately \$7 billion of foreign aid had been disbursed in Palestine. Following the second Intifada, donor states doubled their aid funding to more than \$1 billion annually, equating to approximately \$310 per person per year. According to the Reality of Aid 2011 Report, this level of aid “is unprecedented in any other conflict since the Second World War.”¹ Since 2008, there has been an increase of humanitarian aid in Palestine from \$491 million in 2005 to \$799 million in 2008. In fact, in 2008, Palestine received the most humanitarian aid per capita, and was the fourth largest recipient of humanitarian aid and official development aid (ODA) overall, receiving \$2.6 billion and \$700 million, respectively.²

There are reports indicating that international aid has started to mitigated the severity of many problems that are plaguing

Palestinian society. For example, available data show a decline in the poverty rate in Palestine from 34.5% in 2007 to 25.7% in 2010, which could infer a degree of effectiveness in the aid system and the performance of the Palestinian National Authority, the private sector, and civil society organizations (CSOs). It is worth mentioning that there are significant differences in the poverty rates between the Gaza Strip, at 38%, and the West Bank, at 18.3%. The World Bank estimated that, if income through aid were deducted, poverty rates would climb to 79.4% and 45.7% for the Gaza Strip and West Bank, respectively.

However, a consequence of increased levels of aid is increased levels of dependence on external funding, goods, and services. This is especially true in Gaza, where, as of 2010, the siege impels nearly 80% of the population to rely on food aid, an increase from 63% of the Gazan population in 2006.³ The increased levels of dependence on aid indicate that the generous levels of international aid that have

1- Reality of Aid 2011 Report -- Democratic Ownership and Development Effectiveness: Civil Society Perspectives on Progress Since Paris, 2011.. <http://www.realityofaid.org/userfiles/roareports/roa2011part2.pdf>

2- Global Humanitarian Assistance, Palestine/OPT, (Country profile), 2011. <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/palestine>

3- Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, Israel Reduces Wheat Supply to the Gaza Strip: Food Security in Gaza at Greater Risk as Israeli Siege Continues, December 7, 2010. http://www.mezan.org/en/details.php?id=11120&ddname=Crossings&id_dept=9&id2=9&p=center

been sent to Palestine have not been effective in solving the root cause of the poor social indicators.

In spite of improvements that have been observed over the past decade, international aid still has many limitations. Most aid comes in short-term installments of less than one year. Not only does this make it difficult for recipient communities to adequately address their ongoing, long-term needs, but it also creates an additional layer of dependency. Furthermore, increasing amounts of aid money are being earmarked for emergency projects rather than development projects. Such short-sighted projects can actually be harmful to communities in many ways, whereas alternate approaches that invest in the community can provide deeper, longer-lasting, developmental benefits. For example, simple distribution of food packages creates dependency and stagnates the local markets for local wholesalers and retailers. On the other hand, an investment in small, organic food production by local farmers supports the rights of Palestinians while simultaneously providing enhanced, sustainable access to food. Aid programs should ultimately contribute to deeper, empowering, developmental issues of community self-reliance.

Aid to the agricultural sector represents a more sustainable form of aid that addresses food insecurity in the oPt from a developmental standpoint. Aid dedicated to developing the Palestinian agricultural sector would yield sustainable progress in the fight against food insecurity by empowering the Palestinian people to provide for themselves. Recent statistics from the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) show that donor aid for the agricultural sector in the oPt has consistently improved in recent years, albeit slightly. While it only accounted for 3.7% of the total aid in 2006, the percentage of allocation rose to 5.3% in 2007, declined slightly to 5.1% in 2008, and then rose back to 6% in 2009.⁴ While this trend is promising, even steeper increases would result in more independence from foreign aid in the long run.

Despite current trends, there is much that international and Palestinian CSOs can do to help Palestinians sustainably lower food insecurity. Interventions by the nonprofit community must specifically target Palestinian food

4- Reality of Aid 2011 Report -- Democratic Ownership and Development Effectiveness: Civil Society Perspectives on Progress Since Paris, 2011. <http://www.realityofaid.org/userfiles/roareports/roa2011part2.pdf>

production capabilities. Both large and small scale development projects are needed to ensure that Palestinians have a sustainable means to produce food. These projects can take many forms, but all should be focused on completely removing the need for food aid. The goal of aid and development agencies, in other words, should be to make themselves obsolete.

On a small scale, the development of small food production facilities, such as home gardens and baby greenhouses, are an ideal way to promote independent food production on a household level. MA'AN Development Center is a leading organization on the Palestinian national level in food security and concerning the development of the Palestinian agricultural sector. MA'AN has a long history of supporting sustainable development in Palestine by targeting individuals, households and communities that lack the ability to independently produce food. Projects that support agricultural and animal husbandry as well as projects that establish household rabbit, sheep, goat, or beehive units not only provide food for the beneficiaries, but also provide families with a lasting means of income and,

importantly, the ability to continue producing food long after the end of the project. Likewise, international interventions should be supporting the vital Palestinian olive oil industry through activities that facilitate the production and marketing of olive oil, rehabilitate and reclaim agricultural land, and ensure proper water facilities, such as water collection tanks, ponds and irrigation systems. Interventions such as these certainly do not begin to tackle the root cause of food insecurity, but support of Palestinian food production – on any level – will help sustainably reduce the number of Palestinians dependent on Israel as well as on international aid.

After all, the fundamental problem in Palestine is not related to emergency circumstances, or even to a limited capacity for food production. Palestinians' food insecurity is impacted by Palestine's lack of food sovereignty, which is the result of a political problem. As such, in addition to providing short-term, yet sustainable relief, an appropriate role for international agencies would be to apply the political pressure that is required to address the political problem of Palestinian food sovereignty.

US\$ 2.5 billion in aid was delivered to Palestine in 2010, representing 36% of Palestinian GDP.

[PNA "Building the State of Palestine." 2011. P. 24]

1 Wednesday

الأربعاء

2 Thursday

الخميس

3 Friday

الجمعة

August

آب

W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F
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August
آب

4 Saturday السبت

5 Sunday الأحد

6 Monday الاثنين

NOTESملاحظات

August

آب

W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F
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August
آب

2012

7 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

8 Wednesday

الأربعاء

9 Thursday

الخميس

*International Day of the World's
Indigenous People*

10 Friday

الجمعة

August

آب

W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F
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August

آب

11

Saturday

السبت

12

Sunday

الأحد

- International Youth Day

- Tal Al-Zatar Refugee Camp Massacre in Lebanon-1976

13

Monday

الاثنين

NOTES

ملاحظات

August

آب

W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F							
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August
آب

2012

14 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

15 Wednesday

الأربعاء

Lailat Al-Qadr Assumption

16 Thursday

الخميس

17 Friday

الجمعة

August

آب

W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F
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August
آب

18 Saturday السبت

19 Sunday الأحد

20 Monday الاثنين

Eid El Feter.

NOTES ملاحظات

Augustآب

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August
آب

2012

21 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

22 Wednesday

الأربعاء

23 Thursday

الخميس

*International Day for the Remembrance
of the Slave Trade and its Abolition*

24 Friday

الجمعة

August

آب

W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F
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August
آب

25 Saturday السبت

26 Sunday الأحد

27 Monday الاثنين

NOTES ملاحظات

August														آب																
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August
آب

2012

28 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

29 Wednesday

الأربعاء

30 Thursday

الخميس

31 Friday

الجمعة

August

آب

W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F
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Sample of MA'AN's Projects



in Food Security in WBGS





September 2024

September

**Environmental
degradation in
Palestine**

Environmental degradation in Palestine

Sustainable environmentalism is a key component of food sovereignty; without care for the environment and natural resources, the subsequent inability to autonomously produce healthy and nutritious food creates a dependence on food imports. Environmentally destabilizing practices result in a deteriorating ability to independently produce food and thus must be avoided. Care for the environment is particularly important in Palestine where, as we have seen, there are already a significant number of obstacles denying Palestinians the right to food sovereignty. Faced with these other destabilizing issues, Palestinians must be able to preserve the purity of the food resources that are still accessible.

Environmental degradation, unfortunately, has become one of the defining characteristics of the Israeli occupation, particularly in the agriculturally important areas of the Jordan Valley and the Gaza Strip. Unregulated use of

agrochemicals, overutilization of water resources, a lack of waste treatment facilities and the use of Palestinian land as a dumping site have all contributed to a quickly deteriorating Palestinian environment that has had and will continue to have severe consequences on Palestinian agricultural production.

The proliferation of unregulated pesticides has become a major problem throughout Palestine. Complete Israeli control over Palestinian borders has prevented the Palestinian Authority from monitoring the substances that are imported from Israel, leading to unsuitably high levels of agrochemical usage. In the West Bank alone, 30,000 tons of chemical fertilizers and manure and 502.7 tons of pesticides are used annually.¹ Moreover, 14 internationally banned substances are used on crops in Palestine, including a ozone-depleting chemical called methyl bromide (CH₃Br, bromomethane). Nearly 200

1- MA'AN Development Center, Restricted Access and Its Consequences, 2011, pg. 27.

tons of methyl bromide are used in Palestine every year accounting for over 40% of total pesticide use. Although the Palestinian Authority has banned the use of this chemical, it is unable to prevent its flow into Palestine from Israel, one of the world's largest consumers and producers of the harmful chemical. The unregulated use of agrochemicals in Palestinian communities and settlements is already resulting in environmental degradation. Run-off from agricultural fields can contaminate surface water, while the toxic residue of agrochemicals naturally seeps into the ground water sources. Consequently, the extreme use of agrochemicals has resulted in the contamination of the Palestinian water sources and a deterioration of the soil quality.

Additionally, Palestinians have very little access to waste management or disposal facilities, forcing most Palestinians to dispose of solid and water waste in environmentally unhealthy ways. Although there has been

an increase in trash collection in the urban areas of the West Bank, there is still a prolific use of environmentally-unsound waste disposal practices, such as burning trash or dumping waste in unlined and unsanitary landfills. In the Jordan Valley, including the city of Jericho, there is no waste disposal facility, forcing many to improperly dispose of waste in ways that threaten important food resources such as soil and water. Likewise, in Gaza, there are only three antiquated waste management facilities and no means to separate toxic and nontoxic waste. Landfills, the most common means of waste disposal in Gaza, are generally unlined and often located near water resources. The predictable result is that toxins from waste, in both the West Bank and Gaza, are seeping into the groundwater sources and tainting what had once been healthy drinking water. In fact, water testing in Gaza and the West Bank has found significant levels of fecal coliform in drinking water, making it unsuitable for consumption. Moreover, the dearth of waste

water treatment facilities in Gaza has forced Palestinians to release untreated water directly into the Mediterranean Sea. Around 40-50 million liters per day is pumped into the sea, leading to E. coli in the waters and the killing off or driving away of important fish populations (see July).

The Palestinian environment is also being used as a dumping site by Israel. The Israeli settlers in the West Bank, for example, each dump 1.77 kg of untreated or partially treated solid waste on Palestinian land everyday, while the settlements together produce 38 million cubic meters of waste water yearly.² As of 2004, only 6% of Israeli settlements adequately treated waste, and only 81 settlements, and no outposts, were connected to any waste treatment facility.³ Most settlements allow waste water and solid waste to be pumped into nearby Palestinian wadis (valleys), directly affecting the quality of Palestinian water sources. Moreover, every year,

10.5 million cubic meters of waste is dumped by the Jerusalem municipality into the Kidron stream and travels through the Jordan Valley, terminating in the Dead Sea.⁴

Reports have shown that the Israeli authorities have been secretly dumping waste and poisonous materials from Israel proper on Palestinian land. It is also known that the Israeli military has buried harmful substances such as zinc, and nickel in the West Bank, and there are fears that the Israeli government may have buried various nuclear materials in Palestinian land as well.⁵ Meanwhile, Israel has reportedly been disposing of waste water from Israel proper into the Gaza Valley.⁶

Finally, though Palestinians are restricted from utilizing both the Dead Sea and the Jordan River, these two historical bodies of water are and will be two of the most important water sources for both Israel and a future Palestinian state. Yet Israeli water

2- MA'AN Development Center, Restricted Access and Its Consequences, 2011, pg. 33.

3- *ibid.*

4- *ibid.*

5- *ibid.*

6- Press TV, Israel Using Gaza as Waste Dump, January 9, 2011.

policies since the beginning of the occupation have severely -- and perhaps irreparably -- damaged both bodies of water. By constructing several dams in the tributary sources for both the Dead Sea and the Jordan River -- notably in Lake Tiberias -- Israel has greatly reduced the flow of the Jordan River and significantly lowered the water level of the Dead Sea. The Jordan River, in the mid-1960s, reached up to 40-60 meters across as 1.3 billion cubic meters of fresh water flowed through. Today, however, the width of the river has shrunk to around six meters at its widest point while water flow has been reduced by 98% to only 20-40 million cubic meters annually.

The reduced flow of the Jordan River has, of course, affected the Dead Sea. Due to the decreased flow of water into the world's lowest body of water, the Dead Sea water level has been decreasing at a rate of around one meter per year, resulting in the sea actually splitting into two separate basins. The retreating water levels are only amplified by the variety of Israeli factories (one of which produces the ozone-depleting, illegal pesticide

methyl bromide, mentioned above) along the shore that pump more than 250 million cubic meters of water annually from the Dead Sea. Consequently, these two water sources, at one point bountiful, historical, and religiously significant, have been reduced to environmental disasters.⁷

The preservation of the Palestinian environment is essential to the ability of the Palestinian people to achieve their right to food sovereignty. Access to clean water and toxin-free land is required if Palestinian agriculture is ever to return to sustainable and independent food production. The occupation, in both Gaza and the West Bank, has directly damaged the environment through specific Israeli policies and also prevented the Palestinian people and the Palestinian Authority from independently caring for their environment. The subsequent damage to the Palestinian natural resources must be stopped and reversed in order for Palestinians to truly become food sovereign.

7- MA'AN Development Center, *Destructive Environmentalism*, 2011.

September

أيلول

1

Saturday

السبت

2

Sunday

الأحد

3

Monday

الاثنين

NOTES

ملاحظات

SEPTEMBER																					أيلول								
S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S							
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September
أيلول

2012

4 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

5 Wednesday

الأربعاء

6 Thursday

الخميس

7 Friday

الجمعة

SEPTEMBER

أيلول

S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S							
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September

أيلول

8

Saturday

السبت

International Literacy Day

9

Sunday

الأحد

10

Monday

الاثنين

NOTES

ملاحظات

SEPTEMBER																					أيلول								
S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S							
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September
أيلول

2012

11 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

12 Wednesday

الأربعاء

13 Thursday

الخميس

14 Friday

الجمعة

SEPTEMBER

أيلول

S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S							
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September

أيلول

15

Saturday

السبت

International Day of Democracy

16

Sunday

الأحد

- International Day for the
Preservation of the Ozone Layer
- Massacre at Sabra and Shatila
refugee camps in Beirut-1982

17

Monday

الاثنين

NOTES

ملاحظات

SEPTEMBER																												أيلول	
S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S
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September
أيلول

2012

18 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

19 Wednesday

الأربعاء

20 Thursday

الخميس

21 Friday

الجمعة

International Day of Peace

SEPTEMBER

أيلول

S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S							
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September

أيلول

22 Saturday السبت

23 Sunday الأحد

24 Monday الاثنين

NOTES ملاحظات

SEPTEMBER																								أيلول					
S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S							
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September
أيلول

2012

25 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

26 Wednesday

الأربعاء

27 Thursday

الخميس

28 Friday

الجمعة

2nd Palestinian Intifada-2000

SEPTEMBER

أيلول

S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S							
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September
أيلول

29 Saturday

السبت

30 Sunday

الأحد



September
أيلول

2012





10150

October
**Coping
Mechanisms**

Coping Mechanisms

The lack of Palestinian food sovereignty, as we have seen, has directly contributed to an increase in the food insecurity levels in Palestine. Food insecurity, of course, is more encompassing than simply not being able to access enough food. People not only have the right to food, but to safe, healthy, and nutritious food. When there is a shortfall in the consumption of food, families are forced to make difficult choices in order to ensure survival. As the price of milk rises, for example, some will need to choose between the nutrition of milk and educational materials for a child. These unfortunate choices are defined as coping mechanisms: how families are able to cope with a lack of food, income, or both.

There are two basic types of coping mechanisms. The first is to alter household consumption patterns for a short term. Families may reduce the amount of expensive meat consumed or not pay utility bills. In general, there are four types of short-term coping mechanisms. Families may change their diet (eating less meat,) attempt to purchase more food using short term unsustainable mechanisms (buying food on credit), reduce the number of people to feed (marrying

a child or sending children to a neighbor), or simply reduce the amount of food consumed. The second type of coping mechanism is far more damaging. Faced with severe food insecurity, households may be forced to sell valuable income-earning assets. Herding communities, for example, earn all of their income from their livestock. Confronted with severe food insecurity, households may have no other option than to sell off their herds, leaving the economic future of the household in jeopardy.

Regardless of the severity of the coping strategy, families who are forced into this unfortunate choice will inevitably reduce the nutritional content of the food that they consume. Naturally, a reduction of important nutrients is particularly damaging for children. When families reduce consumption of animal products, fruits, or vegetables -- a common coping mechanism in Palestine -- they are also reducing the essential vitamins and minerals ingested. Reports have shown that throughout the entire Palestinian territory, there has been a constant per capita drop in protein, carbohydrates, and lipid consumption. Without proper nutrition, the growth of children

is stunted or delayed. Stunted growth is common in Palestine and is directly related to a lack of protein and micronutrients. Over 10% of Palestinian children have stunted growth related to malnutrition. In Gaza, where food insecurity is higher, 13.2% of children have stunted growth patterns. Nearly 1.5% of Palestinian children are diagnosed with acute malnutrition (wasting) and nearly 3% are underweight.¹

Poor nutrition due to the use of advanced coping mechanisms also has drastic consequences for newborns and expecting mothers. In the Hebron governorate in the West Bank, 9% of newborns are diagnosed with low birth weight (defined as a new born weighing under 2.5 kg). The level of low birth rate reaches 8.4% of newborns in Khan Younis in the Gaza Strip. Low birth weight is directly linked to permanent developmental deficiencies such as chronic brain damage, language learning problems, and a variety of physical disabilities. Low birth weight also has a negative impact on the infant mortality rate of Palestinians.² Anemia is perhaps the most prevalent deficiency

linked to coping mechanisms in Palestine. Caused by deficiencies of iron and B12, anemia can reach life threatening levels of severity. In Palestine, 61.6% of children and 29.1% of pregnant women are diagnosed with anemia.³

With elevated food insecurity levels throughout Palestine, many Palestinian families, particularly in Gaza and Area C in the West Bank, are forced to revert to a variety of coping mechanisms to ensure that their children are able eat. Unfortunately, the food insecurity levels for some Palestinians are so severe that no coping mechanism is effective enough to ensure even one healthy meal each day. For most Palestinians who are facing food insecurity, deferring payment of utility bills, using credit to purchase food, or reducing the quality and quantity of food are unfortunate, but necessary coping mechanisms; nearly 43% of food insecure Palestinians have deferred the payment of a utility bill while 42% reported purchasing food using credit, a third of Palestinian households reported lower quality food, and 29% reported consuming less food.⁴

1- Applied Research Institute - Jerusalem, *Socio-Economic & Food Security Atlas*, pg.55

2- Applied Research Institute - Jerusalem, *Socio-Economic & Food Security Atlas*, pg.55

3- Applied Research Institute - Jerusalem, *Socio-Economic & Food Security Atlas*, pg.55

4- Food and Agriculture Organization, *Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey*, 2011 pg. 16

These measures are more prominent in Area C of the West Bank, much of which is in the Jordan Valley. Over 75% of food-insecure households in the Jordan Valley are buying food on credit, 40% have not paid their utility bills in the past six months, 81% have decreased their spending on food, 94% have reduced the quality of food, and 93% have reduced their consumption of meat and milk.⁵ In the Gaza Strip, the numbers are even more shocking. Of those who are forced into coping with food

5- Unicef, Food Security and Nutrition Survey for Herding Communities in Area C, 2010 pg. 6-7

insecurity, 96% have decreased the amount spent on food, 94% have reduced the quality of food, 60% have reduced the quantity of food consumed, and 95% have reduced the amount of meat consumed.

These coping mechanisms are temporary at best and often result in deeper financial problems. Moreover, if food availability for certain households does not improve, food-insecure Palestinians will eventually exhaust their coping mechanisms, resulting in a severe humanitarian crisis.

1 Monday

الأثنين

International Day for Older Persons

NOTES

ملاحظات

OCTOBER												تشرين الأول											
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2

Tuesday

الثلاثاء

- Al-Aqsa massacre-1990

- International Day of non-Violence

3

Wednesday

الأربعاء

4

Thursday

الخميس

5

Friday

الجمعة

World Teacher's Day

October
تشرين الأول

6 Saturday السبت

7 Sunday الأحد

8 Monday الاثنين

NOTESملاحظات

OCTOBER												تشرين الأول																		
M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W							
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October
تشرين الأول

2012

9 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

10 Wednesday

الأربعاء

World Mental Health Day

11 Thursday

الخميس

12 Friday

الجمعة

OCTOBER

تشرین الأول

M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W
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October
تشرين الأول

13 Saturday

السيت

14 Sunday

الأحد

15 Monday

الأثنين

15-Oct - 15-Nov
Palestinian Olive Harvest

NOTES

ملاحظات

OCTOBER

تشرين الأول

M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W
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16 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

World Food Day

17 Wednesday

الأربعاء

International Day for the
Eradication of Poverty

18 Thursday

الخميس

19 Friday

الجمعة

OCTOBER

تشرين الأول

M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W
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October
تشرين الأول

20 Saturday السبت

21 Sunday الأحد

22 Monday الاثنين

NOTES ملاحظات

OCTOBER												تشرين الأول																		
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23 Tuesday الثلاثاء

24 Wednesday الأربعاء

- United Nations Day & World
Development Information Day
- 24-30 Disarmament Week

25 Thursday الخميس

26 Friday الجمعة

- Eid Al-Adha

OCTOBER												تشرين الأول											
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																			30	31			

October
تشرين الأول

27 Saturday السبت

28 Sunday الأحد

29 Monday الاثنين

Kufur Qasim Massacre-1956

NOTES ملاحظات

OCTOBER																								تشرين الأول						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W							
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30 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

31 Wednesday

الأربعاء



Photo by Amal Arouri





November
**Land
Confiscation**

Land Confiscation

Land confiscation has been a key feature of Israel's occupation of Palestinian lands since the start of the occupation in 1967. Indeed, one of the first military orders issued confiscated the precious land running along the Jordan River. In Gaza, Palestinian land is confiscated through the unilateral implementation of the buffer zone that prohibits Palestinian use of up to 40% of the most valuable Gazan farm land (see February). In the West Bank, the means of land confiscation vary. The construction of the separation wall and the establishment of closed military zones or nature reserves prohibit Palestinian use of valuable land. Each method of dispossession is strategically linked, resulting in disastrous consequences for the Palestinians and a continuously expanding Israeli grip on Palestine.

Construction of the separation wall began in June 2002 and has not yet been completed. When finished, 85% of the wall will be located on Palestinian land, rather than on the Green

Line (the internationally recognized border), resulting in a length of 709 kilometers, or twice as long as the Green Line itself. Once the wall is completed, 9.5% of the West Bank -- or 119,500 dunums -- will be effectively annexed, including 60 settlements. Although Palestinian farmers are supposed to be allowed to tend to their lands that are now on the other side of the wall, there has been a drastic drop in the number of permits issued: from 10,037 to only 1,640.¹ Consequently, the construction of the wall has separated thousands of Palestinians from their primary means of income.

By assuring that the route of the wall incorporates as many settlements as possible and a significant amount of Palestinian agricultural land (but very few Palestinian communities), Israel has demonstrated that the supposed justification for the wall - security - is simply a cover for land expropriation. Many domestic and international organizations, including B'tselem in Israel and the

1- B'tselem, *The Separation Barrier* supplement, 2011.

International Court of Justice, have condemned the wall as a means of land confiscation.² Even the Israeli Supreme Court has questioned the logic of the current path of the wall (and even ordered one section rerouted), as it was clear that the winding route that expropriated the most Palestinian land had few advantages for Israeli security and made life for Palestinians living near the wall unjustifiably difficult.

Additionally, Israeli settlements are a definitive feature of the West Bank topography. Currently there are 121 settlements and over 100 outposts in the occupied Palestinian territories, which are expanding at an accelerating rate.³ Their population alone has doubled in the past 18 years to over 520,000.

2- See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 2004, B'tselem Under the Guise of Security, 2005.

3- B'tselem, Land Expropriation and Statistics supplement 2011; states that "the growth rate is two and a half times higher than that of the general population in Israel: 4.9 and 1.9 respectively. Furthermore, 26.4% of this increase in settler population were Israelis who moved from inside Israel or new immigrants to Israel who settled there."

Throughout the West Bank, settlements and outposts are connected through a complex series of Israeli-only roads with security zones on either side prohibiting Palestinian use of the land. As of 2009, there were 104 km of Israeli-only roads that Palestinians are completely denied access to in addition to another 180 km that have various levels of restrictions. These roads not only connect the settlements to each other and to Israel proper, but they also slice the West Bank into smaller enclaves. This network of discriminatory roads led OCHA to condemn the roads, built on confiscated Palestinian land, on the basis that:

"First, Palestinians are restricted from using roads between their key towns and communities. Second, the roads have become barriers for Palestinians wishing to cross them. They have, therefore, further fragmented the West Bank by creating isolated Palestinian enclaves."⁴

4- Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC), Separate Roads Increasingly Part of West Bank Map, 2010

The appropriation of Palestinian land in order to construct roads that are accessible to only Israelis also serves to increase the sustainability of settlement expansion. With a viable network of roads that connect the settlements, these Israeli colonies are able to more easily expand onto more Palestinian land. Although the built-up areas of the settlements constitute less than 1% of the area of the West Bank, the municipal areas of settlements enables settlement control over 42% of the land area, or 2,399,824 dunums.⁵ The process for expanding settlements includes “using a complex legal bureaucratic system...primarily to build them and to reserve land for their expansion.”⁶

Control over Palestinian land is compounded by the classification of large swaths of grazing areas in Area C as closed military zones and natural reserves. Currently in the Jordan Valley, 240,000 dunums have been classified as natural reserves or military zones, preventing Palestinian

usage of the land.⁷ Including the military zone preventing Palestinian access to the Jordan River, military bases and natural reserves comprise 44.37% of the Jordan Valley. This land is closed to Palestinians and, through the designation of state land, could potentially be used to expand settlements⁸ - which already constitute 50% of the Jordan Valley.⁹

These methods have created a sophisticated network of land confiscation that have both dispossessed Palestinians and allowed Israel to strengthen its settlement project. As more land is taken for military and settlement expansion, the Palestinian population will continue to lose control over land and resources, increasing dependence on Israel and, ultimately, reducing the ability of Palestinians to become food sovereign.

7- MA'AN Development Center, The Jordan Valley: Documenting the Violations of the Israeli Occupation Forces in the Jordan Valley, 2011, pg. 18.

8- B'tselem, Access Denied, 2008, pg. 7.

9- MA'AN Development Center, Eye on the Jordan Valley, 2010, pg. 3.

5- B'tselem, By Hook and by Crook, 2010 pg. 5, 11.

6- B'tselem, Access Denied, 2008, pg. 16.

November
تشرين الثاني

2012



1 Thursday

الخميس

2 Friday

الجمعة

Balfour Declaration 1917

NOVEMBER

تشرين الثاني

T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F
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November
تشرين الثاني

3 Saturday السبت

4 Sunday الأحد

5 Monday الاثنين

NOTESملاحظات

NOVEMBER														تشرين الثاني															
T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F
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6

Tuesday

الثلاثاء

International Day for Preventing the Exploitation of the Environment of the Environment in War and Armed Conflict

7

Wednesday

الأربعاء

7-16 Week Against the Apartheid Wall

8

Thursday

الخميس

9

Friday

الجمعة

International Day Against the Wall- Destruction of the Berlin Wall-1989

November
تشرين الثاني

10 Saturday السبت

11 Sunday الأحد

Death of Palestinian
President Yasser Arafat-2004

12 Monday الإثنين

NOTES ملاحظات

NOVEMBER														تشرين الثاني															
T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F
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13 Tuesday الثلاثاء

14 Wednesday الأربعاء

Al-Hijra, 1433 (Islamic New Year)

15 Thursday الخميس

- Declaration of Palestinian
Independence

16 Friday الجمعة

International Day of Tolerance

NOVEMBER															تشرين الثاني														
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November
تشرين الثاني

17 Saturday السبت

18 Sunday الأحد

19 Monday الأثنين

NOTES ملاحظات

NOVEMBER														تشرين الثاني															
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20 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

Universal Children's Day

21 Wednesday

الأربعاء

22 Thursday

الخميس

23 Friday

الجمعة

NOVEMBER

تشرين الثاني

T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F
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November
تشرين الثاني

24 Saturday السبت

25 Sunday الأحد

International Day for the Elimination
of Violence against Women

26 Monday الاثنين

NOTES ملاحظات

NOVEMBER														تشرين الثاني															
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27 Tuesday الثلاثاء

28 Wednesday الأربعاء

29 Thursday الخميس

- International day of Solidarity
with the Palestinian People
- UN Resolution 181-1947

30 Friday الجمعة

NOVEMBER															تشرين الثاني														
T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F
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Journal

December

The Road to Food Sovereignty

The Road to Food Sovereignty

It was not until 2003 that the first food security assessment occurred for the Palestinian territories. In that initial survey, at perhaps the height of repression during the second Intifada, it was found that nearly a third of Palestinians were food insecure and another 10% were vulnerable to food insecurity. This number has remained more or less constant since that initial assessment. Despite being the recipient of one of the largest humanitarian aid packages (over US\$4 billion from 2003-2009) there has been no significant progress in eliminating or even decreasing food insecurity in Palestine. In Area C of the West Bank and all of the Gaza strip, food insecurity has risen in the past 10 years despite millions of dollars of international humanitarian aid.

Of course, the inability to diminish the unacceptably high levels of food insecurity is because the international community has been addressing the symptoms, rather than the core disease. International humanitarian agencies have been giving Palestinians food aid rather than trying to identify and eliminate the obstacles preventing them from sustainably feeding themselves. Certainly, high food

insecurity levels, particularly in Area C of the West Bank and in Gaza, must be targeted by international and domestic aid agencies. These food insecurity levels of 52% in Gaza and 79% in Area C are more than numbers. These represent real Palestinian families who are forced to struggle everyday to do something as simple as feed their children. In this way, the emergency humanitarian aid sent annually to Palestine is essential; without the food relief, 80% of families in Gaza would be unable to survive.¹

These horrifying statistics, however, are merely symptomatic of the political cancer that plagues Palestine. High food insecurity levels are not caused by high levels of poverty or unemployment. These are all simply manifestations of the same political malaise. Palestinians are forced to rely on food aid not because they lack the resources to provide for themselves, but because they are denied their legal, moral, and basic right to access and utilize those resources. It is the right of Palestinians, as human beings, to access clean water and to plant and harvest on their own land;

1- CIDSE, *The EU's Aid to the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2008, pg. 12

to export surplus production and to set tariffs on imports; and to decide what to plant when and where. It is their right, in other words, to dictate their own food policy. This is a right that is protected by international law, but is repeatedly and consistently denied by the Israeli occupation. Without targeting the disease itself, the symptoms will not disappear. Food sovereignty encompasses food insecurity, and food insecurity should be viewed as a measurement of food sovereignty. In this way, international aid organizations should be focusing on how to increase food sovereignty in order to reduce food insecurity rather than trying to blindly attack food security problems without attention to the fundamental cause.

The restrictions that Israel enforces on Palestine are not only preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state, but they are also punishing the Palestinian people by denying them the basic right to food. Limitations on the use of water and on the freedom of movement, as well as the destruction of the Palestinian environment ensures that Palestinians will not have the means to autonomously

reduce food insecurity. Without sovereignty over Palestinian land and food resources, it will be impossible for Palestine to create a food policy independent of Israel -- impossible to be truly food sovereign.

The international community must focus more on the malady than the symptoms. Reports on food security, poverty, and unemployment levels certainly help paint a picture of the current Palestinian reality, but they will do little to upend the Israeli mechanisms for ensuring the continuity of the situation. Israel must be pressured to allow Palestinian control over Palestinian land and resources. Roadblocks and checkpoints must be removed from Palestinian territory to allow a true freedom of movement. The killing of Palestinians in the Gaza buffer zone and the unreasonable and unlawful nautical limit must stop. Water resources must be shared more justly between neighbors and waste disposal and management systems must be permitted throughout the Palestinian territory. These are the difficult but practical first steps to sustainably reducing food insecurity in Palestine.

December

كانون الأول

1

Saturday

السبت

World AIDS Day

2

Sunday

الأحد

International Day for the Abolition of Slavery

3

Monday

الاثنين

International Day of Disabled Persons

NOTES

ملاحظات

DECEMBER																												كانون الأول		
S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

December
كانون الأول

2012

4 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

5 Wednesday

الأربعاء

*International Volunteer Day for
Economic and Social Development*

6 Thursday

الخميس

7 Friday

الجمعة

DECEMBER

كانون الأول

S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

December

كانون الأول

8

Saturday

السبت

9

Sunday

الأحد

- International anti-Corruption Day

- 1st Palestinian Intifada 1987

10

Monday

الاثنين

Human Rights Day

NOTES

ملاحظات

DECEMBER																												كانون الأول		
S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

December
كانون الأول

2012

11 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

12 Wednesday

الأربعاء

13 Thursday

الخميس

14 Friday

الجمعة

DECEMBER

كانون الأول

S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

December
كانون الأول

15 Saturday السبت

16 Sunday الأحد

17 Monday الاثنين

NOTES ملاحظات

DECEMBER																					كانون الأول									
S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

December
كانون الأول

2012

18 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

19 Wednesday

الأربعاء

United Nations Day for South-South Cooperation

20 Thursday

الخميس

International Human Solidarity Day

21 Friday

الجمعة

DECEMBER

كانون الأول

S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

December

كانون الأول

22 Saturday السبت

23 Sunday الأحد

24 Monday الأثنين

- Christmas Eve
- Israel launches Operation
Cast Lead in Gaza Strip
killing over 1,400-2009

NOTESملاحظات

DECEMBER														كانون الأول																
S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

December
كانون الأول

2012

25 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

Christmas

26 Wednesday

الأربعاء

27 Thursday

الخميس

28 Friday

الجمعة

DECEMBER

كانون الأول

S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

December

كانون الأول

29 Saturday السبت

30 Sunday الأحد

31 Monday الاثنين

NOTESملاحظات

DECEMBER																												كانون الأول		
S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

December
كانون الأول

2013

1 Tuesday

الثلاثاء

2013



Notes

Notes

Notes

Name

Phone Num.

Email Address

Name

Phone Num.

Email Address

Name

Phone Num.

Email Address

Name

Phone Num.

Email Address

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